Northern Ireland, Scotland, United Kingdom

Hey! What about gay marriage in Scotland and Northern Ireland?

July 18, 2013 Kevin Lees 1 Comment

Amid the fanfare that much of the United Kingdom would now enjoy full same-sex marriage rights following the success of Conservative UK prime minister David Cameron in enacting a successful vote earlier this week in Parliament, some LGBT activists are still waiting at the altar of public policy for their respective day of celebration.

Under the odd devolved system within the United Kingdom of Northern Ireland and Great Britain, it’s up to the separate Northern Ireland Assembly to effect its own laws on marriage. Even within Great Britain, the Scottish parliament, likewise, has the sole power to enact legislation related to marriage rights.

So while nearly 90% of the residents of the country will now be able to enter into same-sex marriages, Scottish and the Northern Irish will have to wait a little longer — and in the case of Northern Ireland, it seems like the wait will be lengthy. Scotland, with 5.3 million people (8.4% of the total UK population), and which will vote on independence in a referendum in September 2014, is already taking steps toward passing legislation, though Northern Ireland, with 1.8 million people (2.9% of the UK population), has already considered and rejected same-sex marriage.

The reason for the disparity within the United Kingdom goes back to former Labour prime minister Tony Blair.

Under the broad devolution process that his ‘New Labour’ government initiated upon taking power in 1997, much of the power to regulate life in Scotland was devolved from Westminster to the new parliament that met for the first time in 1999 at Holyrood. Although a parallel Welsh Assembly exists in Cardiff for Welsh affairs, the Welsh parliament lacks the same breadth of powers that the Scottish parliament enjoys, which is why the Welsh now have same-sex marriage rights. (Take heart, Daffyd!)

Northern Ireland has a similar arrangement, with its own devolved Northern Ireland Assembly at Stormont, though its powers were suspended from 2002 to 2007 when the Northern Ireland peace process fell apart, however briefly.

The disparate courses of English, Scottish and Northern Irish marriage rights are a case study in how devolution works in the United Kingdom today.

Scotland: Holyrood poised to pass an even stronger marriage equality bill in 2014

Scotland’s local government, led by Alex Salmond and the Scottish National Party, introduced a same-sex marriage bill late in June that is set to provide an even more liberal regime of marriage rights. While the marriage bill passed earlier this week in London actually bans the Anglican Church of England from offering same-sex marriage ceremonies, the Scottish bill won’t have the same prohibitions on the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, which is seen as somewhat more relaxed about gay marriage. Like the English legislation, however, the Scottish bill offer protections to ministers on religious grounds who do not choose to officiate same-sex marriages.

Although there’s opposition to the bill within the governing SNP as well as the Scottish Labour Party and the Scottish Liberal Democratic Party, the Conservative Party has very little influence outside England and Scotland, generally speaking, is even more socially progressive than England, which means that the legislation is widely expect to pass in the Scottish Parliament early next year, with the first same-sex marriages in Scotland to take place in 2015.

Northern Ireland: gay marriage as a football between Protestant and Catholic communities

Earlier this year, the Northern Ireland Assembly considered a same-sex marriage bill, but it was defeated in April by a vote of 53 to 42 — a similar motion was defeated in October 2012 by a similar margin. Since 2005, LGBT individuals have been able to enter into civil partnerships (with most, though not all, of the rights of marriage enjoyed by opposite-sex partners) throughout the entire United Kingdom, including Northern Ireland.

When Scotland passes its gay marriage bill next year, however, it will leave Northern Ireland as the only part of the United Kingdom without marriage equality.

Not surprisingly, given that Northern Ireland was partitioned out of the Republic of Ireland in 1921 largely on religious lines, and Protestant-Catholic violence has plagued Northern Ireland for much of the decades since, Northern Ireland is the most religious part of the United Kingdom. A 2007 poll showed that while only 14% of the English and 18% of Scots were weekly churchgoers, fully 45% of the Northern Irish attended church weekly.

Unlike Scotland, where the mainstream UK political parties, such as the Tories, Labour and Liberal Democrats, aim to compete with the Scottish Nationalists (with varying degrees of success), Northern Irish politics are entirely different, based instead on the largely Protestant ‘unionist’ community and the largely Catholic ‘nationalist’ community. Around 41% of Northern Ireland is Roman Catholic, while around 41.5% of Northern Ireland is Protestant (mostly the Presbyterian Church and the Anglican Church of Ireland).

That helps explain why the opposition to gay marriage in Northern Ireland remains so strong, and it doesn’t help that the issue falls along the same lines as the entrenched unionist and nationalist divisions. Given that it’s unlikely either community will come to dominate Northern Irish politics and the Assembly anytime soon, it means that proponents of same-sex marriage will have to convince at least some unionists to join forces with largely supportive nationalist parties to pass a marriage bill — and that may prove a difficult task for a five-way power-sharing government in Belfast that has enough difficulties even without gay marriage. Continue reading Hey! What about gay marriage in Scotland and Northern Ireland? →

Russia

Opposition critic Navalny’s conviction, in Putin’s Russia, is a badge of authenticity

July 18, 2013 Kevin Lees 6 Comments

So right on time, the Russian government has engineered a conviction of Alexei Navalny, the outspoken critic of Russian president Vladimir Putin.

His conviction stems from a truly bizarre accusation that he embezzled around $500,000 out of a timber company in Kirov, an industrial town hundred of miles northeast of Moscow, and all signs indicate that the conviction is politically motivated to remove Navalny as a Putin critic whose following is growing — and his conviction is likely to only enhance his attraction.

Navalny now faces five years in Russian prison far away from Moscow, where Navalny was running to contest the mayoral election on September 8, an election that’s now even more likely to be won by incumbent Sergei Sobyanin, a Putin ally who took power after former mayor Yuri Luzhkov was pushed out of office by then-president Dmitry Medvedev in 2010. The election’s sudden timing effectively prohibited prominent billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov from arranging his complex international finances in order to contest the race, leaving Navalny as the leading prominent challenger.

Prokhorov, who owns the New Jersey Nets, and who waged a presidential campaign in March 2012, has shown that his opposition is a much more delicate dance with the Kremlin than Navalny, who led full-throated protests in Moscow protesting the presidential vote and credible allegations of fraud in the December 2011 elections to the ду́ма (Duma), Russia’s lower legislative chamber. In contrast to Navalny’s sledgehammer opposition, Prokhorov has been more hesitant to cross Putin and Putin’s allies, and it was even speculated last year that Prokhorov’s opposition was entirely manufactured by Putin’s allies. That’s probably not true — after all, Prokhorov, as a good businessman, has much more to lose from a full-throated attack on the Kremlin than Navalny — and he’s forged links with other credible opposition figures like former Russian finance minister Alexei Kudrin.

Navalny had become such a radioactive political figure in recent days that Prokhorov even refused to back Navalny in the Moscow mayoral race, instead endorsing Sergey Troitsky, the lead singer of a Russian heavy metal band, ‘Corrossive Metal,’ and who is most well-known by his stage name, Pauk, which means ‘spider’ in Russian.

But Navalny’s conviction today means that he’s likely to leapfrog the tentative Prokhorov and other anti-Putin activists as the central figure of the Russian opposition. Russian prisons are notoriously brutal places, rife with violence and diseases, including drug-resistant tuberculosis, and Navalny faces some amount of peril in the years ahead. Navalny’s conviction is already drawing international condemnation, and Putin will now have succeeded in elevating a one-time gadfly into a political figure empowered with the authenticity of someone who’s willing to face down Russia’s horrible prisons as the price of speaking out against Putin.

Navalny tweeted and blogged to his supporters, encouraging them to keep up his fight against Putin’s dominant Еди́ная Росси́я (United Russia) party, which he famously referred to as a ‘party of crooks and thieves.’

After the verdict, Navalny tweeted: “So that’s it. Don’t get bored without me. Most importantly, don’t sit around doing nothing. The toad won’t get off the oil pipe by itself.”

In his LiveJournal blog on Wednesday Navalny said: “The current authorities are not a big, healthy fish, but rather a bloated fish or Latin American toad, which puffs itself up when it sees danger, with the help of television.”

Utlimately, Navalny’s trial and conviction are another indication that the Putin administration intends on being as fully authoritarian as it needs to be to hold onto power, in the same way that prominent opposition leader and former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko remained — and still remains — in prison over politically motivated charges in neighboring Ukraine during last October’s parliamentary elections.

But Putin, in attempting to silence a 21st century critic with ham-fisted 20th century methods, risks that his strategy will backfire by bringing Navalny even more notoriety and credibility. Just witness the international attention that the politically motivated trials against oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky commanded, the sudden 2006 murder of prominent anti-Putin journalist Anna Politkovskaya, or even the suspicions of foul play in the apparent suicide earlier this year of exiled oligarch Boris Berezovsky in London.

Continue reading Opposition critic Navalny’s conviction, in Putin’s Russia, is a badge of authenticity →

Vietnam

After Britain and France, will Vietnam be the next country to enact same-sex marriage?

July 17, 2013 Kevin Lees Leave a comment

Now that the House of Lords has approved changes to the same-sex bill in Parliament in the United Kingdom, same-sex marriage is set to become a reality in England and Wales (a separate Scottish bill is set to follow) under Conservative prime minister David Cameron.

That follows the final enactment of same-sex marriage in France earlier this summer — though the center-right and far right have vocally opposed it, the Assemblée nationale passed the measure with ease in June, fulfilling one of president François Hollande’s key campaign promises.

Great Britain (once Scotland joins) will become the 14th nation-state to have enacted legal same-sex marriage, joining France and eight other European countries,* as well as Argentina, Brazil, Canada and South Africa. That doesn’t include México City or the 13 states (and the District of Columbia)** in the United States that have enacted marriage equality, which comes with the full set of rights and privileges of federal law following the recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Windsor that rules the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional. Last month, Germany’s constitutional court delivered same-sex partnerships a key victory by ruling that they are entitled to the same tax rights as other married couples.

So what’s the next horizon in what’s become a global fight for LGBT rights and marriage equality?

Vietnam.

Probably not what you were thinking, right? After all, Asia has not typically been the most hospitable battleground for LGBT rights.

Moreover, Vietnam is a socialist republic and a one-party state ruled by a party, the Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (Vietnamese Communist Party), that’s been enshrined through Vietnam’s constitution as the sole organ of political affairs since 1975, when North Vietnam formally overran South Vietnam, thereby uniting the entire country under communist rule. The Vietnamese government is repressive on just about every other vector — press freedom, internet freedom, and of course, the kind of political freedom that would allow a challenge to the governing elite. Though the country has been transformed economically as its one-time Marxist roots have been eroded into a more state capitalist approach, and its top destination for exports is now the United States (relations between the two countries have now been normalized for nearly two decades), the zeal for liberalization hasn’t met with the same enthusiasm in other quarters.

Vietnam is most well-known internationally for its economic growth — it’s a ‘Next Eleven‘ country and, while its GDP growth has slowed in recent years, it’s still poised to become a breakout economic power in southeast Asia. It’s also a party to the ambitious Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations that could ultimately establish a free-trade zone among the United States and other South American and Asian countries.

It’s less well-known for its positions on social justice, but it would be a huge coup for the global marriage equality movement — with over 90 million people, it’s the 13th most populous country in the world, and it would be the first Asian jurisdiction to recognize same-sex marriage. Continue reading After Britain and France, will Vietnam be the next country to enact same-sex marriage? →

Italy

Italy’s problem with racism goes far deeper than recent slurs against Cécile Kyenge

July 16, 2013 Kevin Lees 1 Comment

It seems like barely a week goes by without another story coming out of Italy about another racial slur hurled at the Mediterranean country’s first black government minister, Cécile Kyenge.

This week’s row comes from Roberto Calderoli, a member of the Lega Nord (Northern League), the autonomist right-wing party that has in the past allied itself with Silvio Berlusconi, though it’s not part of the current ‘grand coalition’ led by center-left prime minister Enrico Letta.

Calderoli, speaking over the weekend, railed against Kyenge, arguing that her success encourages ‘illegal immigrants’ to come to Italy, that she should be a minister ‘in her own country,’ and added this gem:

“I love animals – bears and wolves, as everyone knows – but when I see the pictures of Kyenge I cannot but think of, even if I’m not saying she is one, the features of an orangutan,” Mr Calderoli said in a speech to a rally in the northern city of Treviso on Saturday.

Calderoli’s comments were unthinkably crass but, unfortunately, they are not atypical in the three months since Kyenge came to power, nor are they incredibly out of the norm for a political culture that has long treated racism with a wink and a smile, such as when Berlusconi himself described Barack Obama, the first black president of the United States, as particularly ‘suntanned.’

Kyenge (pictured above with Letta), an Italian citizen who was born in Congo, came to Italy in 1983, when she set up a practice as a doctor in Modena, in the central Italian region of Emilia-Romagna. Earlier this year, she was first elected to Italy’s Camera dei Deputati (Chamber of Deputies) as a member of Italy’s center-left Partito Democratico (PD, Democratic Party). Letta appointed her as the government’s minister for integration, in part due to the work Kyenge has done since founding DAWA, an association designed to promote multicultural awareness in Italy and to foster cooperation between Italy and Africa. Prior to becoming an Italian deputy, Kyenge served as a provincial councilor in Modena for four years, and she’s a proponent of a jus soli, a law that would grant citizenship to those children of immigrants who are born in Italy.

In short, Kyenge personifies a new kind of 21st century success story for first- and second-generation Europeans in a world where globalized ties are now bound to blur ethnic, racial, national and cultural borders.

It’s worth bearing in mind that this isn’t the first time Calderoli has been accused of racism or insensitivity. He was forced to resign as a minister in a previous Berlusconi government in 2006 after purporting to wear a t-shirt showing the printed cartoons of a Danish newspaper depicting the prophet Mohammed. (Having returned to a subsequent Berlusconi government a few years later, it was Calderoli who drafted the election law that now virtually everyone in Italy agrees is worthless).

Nor is it the first time Northern League politicians have made controversial statements about Kyenge — one of its local politicians earlier in June called for Kyenge to be raped, so she would understand how victims feel, and in April, another European Parliament member, Mario Borghezio, called her part of a ‘bonga, bonga government’ and argued that she wanted to ‘impose her tribal traditions from the Congo.’

Kyenge has accepted Calderoli’s begrudging apology, but it’s not even the only incident this week — members of the far-right Forza Nuova (New Force) party held an anti-immigration protest featuring nooses in Pescara in central Italy.

In the long run, it may well be that Kyenge’s graceful responses to unacceptably mean-spirited and racist comments convince more Italians that there’s no place for racism in Italian public discourse — she has the power to turn ugly incidents like Calderoli’s slur into what Obama himself might call a ‘teachable moment.’

But that task is made equally difficult by the integration portfolio that Kyenge holds, which means that she is responsible for policymaking on immigration and the nearly 4.5 million foreign residents who live in Italy. Even as Kyenge tries to deflect tensions, Calderoli and other Northern League politicians may be using outbursts about Kyenge as a deliberate strategy to inject racial resentment as a potent political wedge issue.

Although migrants have been coming to Italy since the 1970s, which makes immigration to Italy a more recent phenomenon than in other European countries, about two-thirds of Italy’s current foreign residents have arrived in the past decade. The net result is a country that hasn’t had time to develop the political or cultural institutions to cope with a very rapid influx of foreigners, let alone to develop the vocabulary of multiculturalism in a country that can be sometimes quite insular in a way that’s both profound and provincial, troubling and quaint Continue reading Italy’s problem with racism goes far deeper than recent slurs against Cécile Kyenge →

African Union, Cameroon, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Rwanda, Swaziland, Togo, Zimbabwe

Eight sub-Saharan African elections within nine weeks highlights region’s fragile democracy

July 16, 2013 Kevin Lees 3 Comments

In the next three months, eight sub-Saharan African countries will go to the polls to elect a new president and/or parliament, a relative blitz that will not only highlight the region’s growing, if fragile, democratic institutions, but will call attention to many unique issues facing sub-Saharan Africa: unequal and unsteady growth rates, the role of Islamic jihad and security, improving health outcomes, the rule of law and governance standards, and further development of vital infrastructure.

Between July 21 and September 30, voters in countries with an aggregate population of around 100 million are scheduled to cast ballots, though of course not all elections are created equal — or conducted on incredibly equal ground. In some countries, such as Guinea and Togo, it will be a success if the elections actually take place as planned; in other countries, such as Swaziland and Cameroon, elections will be essentially a sideshow of powerlessness. In Zimbabwe, where longtime president Robert Mugabe (pictured above) is seeking yet another term after 33 years in power, and in Madagascar, where voters will choose a new president and legislature after a problematic 2009 coup and a four-year interim government, the vote could herald once-in-a-generation leadership transitions.

Here’s the rundown, in brief:

Togo: July 25

Togo, a small west African nation of 7.15 million people, is scheduled to vote for a new parliament, despite the fact that elections have been cancelled twice — first in October 2012 and again in March 2013. There’s no guarantee that elections this month will actually go forward, either. While the government and opposition have apparently now reached a deal to hold elections later this month, the composition of the electoral commission remains a major open issue.

Togo’s president, Faure Gnassingbé, took office in 2005 with the support of the country’s military following the death of his father, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, who had served as Togo’s president since 1967. Despite winning election in presidential votes in 2005 and 2010, he’s seen as somewhat of an authoritarian leader and his party, the Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT, Rally for the Togolese People) dominates the unicameral Assemblée nationale, holding 50 out of 81 seats. Unlike its neighbors, there’s neither a Christian nor Muslim majority in Togo — out of every two Togolese adheres to indigenous beliefs, though one-third of its residents are Muslim and one-fifth are Christian.

Continue reading Eight sub-Saharan African elections within nine weeks highlights region’s fragile democracy →

Bhutan, India

Do Chinese-Indian relations explain the result of the Bhutanese elections?

July 15, 2013 Kevin Lees Leave a comment

Although it’s only the second election in the brief history of Bhutanese democracy, Bhutan’s voters will mark the precedent of its first democratic transfer of power following Saturday’s election, in which the opposition People’s Democratic Party (PDP, མི་སེར་དམངས་གཙོའི་ཚོགས་པ་) scored a major victory, winning 32 seats to just 15 seats for the governing party.

That’s quite a turnaround from the country’s first-ever election in 2008, when the governing Bhutan Peace and Prosperity Party (Druk Phuensum Tshogpa, DPT, འབྲུག་ཕུན་སུམ་ཚོགས་པ) won 45 out of 47 seats in the country’s Gyelyong Tshogdu (National Assembly), the lower house of the recently promulgated Bhutanese parliament.

The governing DPT is seen as slightly closer to Bhutan’s monarch, the Druk Gyalpo (འབྲུག་རྒྱལ་པོ, its ‘dragon king’), the young Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck who has, like his father before him, smoothed the path toward the gradual development of a constitutional monarchy. But both parties support the constitutional monarchy and both parties have ties to the governing elite. The former PDP leader, for example, is Sangay Ngedup, who previously served as prime minister in the pre-parliamentary era from 1999 to 2000 and from 2005 to 2006. DPT leader and Bhutan’s first elected prime minister, Jigme Thinley, previously served as prime minister from 1998 to 1999 and from 2007 to 2008.

Here’s more background on Bhutan’s idiosyncratic path to democracy at the time of the first round at the end of May, which eliminated two of the four competing political parties, setting the conditions for the July runoff between the DPT and the PDP. Although the governing DPT won 44.52% of the first-round vote to just 32.53% for the opposition PDP, the DPT picked up virtually no support in the weeks following its initial May victory.

Tshering Tobgay (pictured above), the PDP’s current leader, will now become Bhutan’s second prime minister, is a former civil servant, and comes from a younger generation of Bhutanese than either Ngedup or Thinley. (You can watch his TEDx talk in English on happiness here). He’ll come to power on a wave of discontent over many issues, including a rupee shortage last year that brought about a miniature credit crunch in Bhutan caused, in part, by the government’s decision to spend too much of its Indian rupee reserves.

But the outcome may owe much to India’s ham-fisted decision to terminate a kerosene and cooking gas subsidy to its northern neighbor at the end of June, causing prices of the two energy sources to rise, allegedly in retribution for Thinley’s diplomatic overtures to the People’s Republic of China. In the immediate aftermath of Saturday’s election, Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh made it clear that the subsidy would be restored as soon as possible. But the clear implication is that India used its special influence with Bhutan, the top recipient of Indian financial aid, to attempt to intervene in an internal election:

New Delhi was alarmed not just by Thinley, who made himself the official ambassador of Bhutan’s Gross National Happiness phenomenon, reaching out to Beijing but also the manner in which he established diplomatic ties with many other countries without bothering to take South Block into confidence.

Tobgay used the crisis as yet another instance to criticize Thinley for jeopardizing Bhutanese-Indian relations and he’s stated that bilateral relations with India will be his top priority. Though Indian officials now admit the subsidy decision could have been better timed, it’s hard to see how the subsidy dispute could have helped Thinley in the closing days of the Bhutanese campaign. Given the central economic and geopolitical role that India plays in Bhutan, it wasn’t a good sign for Thinley that he spent the final week of the campaign on the defensive over Indian relations. There are a lot of reasons for the PDP’s victory on Saturday, including the wholly separate issue of last year’s rupee shortage, wider doubts about the Bhutanese economy, youth unemployment and the still-unsettled treatment of the Nepalese minority in Bhutan. But it’s not hard to see how the PDP’s success — in southern Bhutan, in particular — came about in large part due to the Indian issue.

To understand why India (and China) are so important to Bhutan is to understand the simple geography of the country:

Continue reading Do Chinese-Indian relations explain the result of the Bhutanese elections? →

Norway

How Erna Solberg became the frontrunner in Norway’s upcoming election

July 12, 2013 Kevin Lees 2 Comments

Norway kicks off a busy month of elections in Europe with parliamentary elections on September 9, and if the past year’s worth of polls are to be trusted, Norwegians seem set to take a right turn, despite one of the best economies in Europe.

If they do so, Norway is likely to have only the second female prime minister in its history — Erna Solberg, who since 2004 has been the leader of the Høyre (literally the ‘Right,’ or more commonly, the Conservative Party).

With less than two months to go, Solberg’s Conservatives have built a growing and steady lead over the governing Arbeiderpartiet (Labour Party) and prime minister Jens Stoltenberg, a popular prime minister who’s governed Norway since 2005.

A familiar face as the Conservative leader for nearly a decade, Solberg served previously as a minister of local government and regional development from 2001 to 2005 in Norway’s previous center-right government, a role that earned her the nickname of ‘Jern-Erna,’ or ‘Iron Erna,’ and she bears some similarity to the other, more familiar center-right leader who’s running for reelection in September as well (catch an English interview with Solberg from April on the U.S.-based CNBC here).

Winning a third consecutive term in office is difficult for any government because, as years go by, the front line of policymakers either leave government or become increasingly fatigued, and governing parties, who have an increasing political stake in the status quo, don’t often regenerate the same quality of new ideas that outside parties do while in opposition.

But it’s hard to understand just why Labour seems so likely headed out of government, especially in light of Stoltenberg’s continued popularity. It’s even more baffling when you consider that Norway is one of the best governed states in Europe, let alone the world. Despite the fact that most of Europe is in recession or zero-growth mode, Norway grew by an estimated 3% in 2012, and the unemployment rate is a laughably low 3.5%. Thanks to its oil wealth, it has had balanced budgets for nearly two decades, the government routinely banks its surplus (an estimated 15% of GDP in 2012) in investment funds for future use, and Norway’s GDP per capita now exceeds $60,000.

That leads to two questions: why are Norwegian voters so adamant about voting out its current government? And how did Solberg and the Conservatives become such clear frontrunners?

Background: politics in the Stoltenberg era

The 2005 election (and the ensuing 2009 election) brought about the balance that’s largely held steady for the past eight years. Stoltenberg currently governs with the support of a ‘Red-Green’ coalition dominated by Labour and its two smaller allies, the democratic socialist Sosialistisk Venstreparti (Socialist Left Party) and the Senterpartiet (Centre Party), a chiefly agrarian party that’s moved from the political right to the political left in recent years. Note that ‘green’ in Norway’s Red-Green coalition indicates the Center Party’s roots in rural life, not its environmental activism.

The 2005 fall of the previous center-right government of prime minster Kjell Magne Bondevik brought a drop in support for both Kristelig Folkeparti (Christian Democratic Party) and his coalition partners, the Conservatives. That left the Framskrittspartiet (Progress Party), a relatively populist party known chiefly for its opposition to much of the Norwegian social welfare state, its advocacy of lower taxes, smaller government and deregulation, and its controversial anti-immigration stance, as the second-largest party in Norway’s parliament. Unlike Labour and the Conservatives, both of which were founded in the late 19th century, the Progress Party emerged only in the 1970s as a modern conservative anti-tax movement. Though it’s grown to become a major force in Norwegian politics over the 1990s and 20o0s, Progress has never formally joined any government, though that seems likely to change, as Solberg is expected to bring Progress into government if her party maintains its polling lead on September 9.

Though if Solberg’s Conservatives win their expected landslide, they will do so in large part by consolidating left-leaning moderates that have supported Labour and right-leaning moderates that have supported Progress.

The latest July 2013 poll-of-polls shows the Conservatives with nearly 32% of the vote, which would give them around 58 seats in the Storting, Norway’s unicameral 169-seat parliament:

That’s a huge jump from the 30 seats the Conservatives hold now, and it’s a massive jump from their 2005 debacle, when they won just 14.1% of the vote and a measly 23 seats.

Even more striking is that Labour might not win the largest plurality of votes and the largest bloc of seats in parliament — for the first time since 1924. Continue reading How Erna Solberg became the frontrunner in Norway’s upcoming election →

Portugal

Coalition crisis brings Portugal back to center-stage in eurozone bailouts saga

July 11, 2013 Kevin Lees 1 Comment

Until today, Portgual’s beleaguered government looked like it would avoid crisis — just barely.

But the decision by Portugal’s president to seek a broad unity government to carry out the terms of Portugal’s bailout program has cast doubt again on whether the center-right government led by Pedro Passos Coelho will be able to serve through the end of its natural term of government in 2015 or at least long enough to see through the termination of the €78 billion bailout program in June 2014.

Despite a deal last week that saw Passos Coelho’s more conservative coalition partners agree to return to government, Portuguese president Aníbal Cavaco Silva, who served as prime minister of Portugal from 1985 to 1995, is now pushing for a broader coalition in light of risks that the government might falter again. Cavaco Silva’s top priority is that Portugal has a reliably strong government to see through the bailout program next year and to avoid snap elections now in favor of early elections sometime next June.

But that appears to have backfired, and it remains unclear just what will happen next in Portugal’s governing crisis — Cavaco Silva’s ploy may have made early elections even likelier, which are certain to become a referendum on further austerity measures in accordance with Portugal’s bailout. The political crisis comes at a time when Lisbon was set to host International Monetary Fund and European Union officials next Monday for a review of the bailout program and amid reports that Portugal will require a second bailout when the current one runs out next year.

Portugal’s most recent crisis began when finance minister Vítor Gaspar resigned on July 1 after rising complaints over the implementation of the bailout program. Gaspar, a technocratic economist first appointed after the June 2011 elections that swept Passos Coelho and his center-right Partido Social Democrata (PSD, Social Democratic Party) into power. He had become the poster child for austerity and widely reviled as Passos Coelho’s party has fallen up to 10 points behind the main center-left opposition, the Partido Socialista (PS, Socialist Party) in polls.

Passos Coelho immediately appointed treasury secretary Maria Luís de Albuquerque as Gaspar’s replacement, but the following day, his foreign minister Paulo Portas resigned. Portas, also the leader of his more socially conservative coalition partner, the Centro Democrático e Social – Partido Popular (CDS-PP, Democratic and Social Center — People’s Party), indicated that he would pull his party’s support from the coalition in opposition to the new finance minister’s appointment, arguing that it marked a continuity of policy with which Portas and his party now disagreed.

Nonetheless, a weekend deal between Passos Coelho and Portas appeared to have healed the rift — Portas would become deputy prime minister and take a larger role in steering the country’s finances, though de Albuquerque would remain as the new finance minister. Though the deal required Cavaco Silva’s approval, it seemed likely to win it this week, given that Cavaco Silva (pictured above) had been crucial in bringing Passos Coelho and Portas back together.

Instead, Cavaco Silva’s call for a unity government to include the Socialist Party as well has renewed the Portuguese political crisis, given that the Socialists and their new leader, António José Seguro, continue to push for early elections rather than join a unity government.

Though Portuguese 10-year bond yields have fallen from a recent July 3 high of 7.47%, they edged up to a still-worrying 6.77% today after Cavaco Silva’s gambit.

While Cavaco Silva may have failed, his logic isn’t unreasonable. Cavaco Silva’s goal was to steer Portugal between what he viewed as two poor alternatives — one in which he’ll have to trust Portas and the conservative Christian Democrats to see through the bailout program, and another in which Portugal faces snap elections that could result in a hung parliament (or worse, if the two major leftist blocs outperform already robust expectations).

Continue reading Coalition crisis brings Portugal back to center-stage in eurozone bailouts saga →

Latvia

Despite risks, Latvia (and all the Baltic states) still wants to join the eurozone

July 10, 2013 Kevin Lees 2 Comments

latviajoins

Latvia was formally accepted yesterday as the 18th member of the eurozone, meaning that on January 1, 2014, it will join Estonia as the only former Soviet republic to have adopted the euro as its currency.

That might be surprising given that, in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis and, in particular, the ensuing eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the eurozone has not been the most popular club.

Malta and Cyprus joined at the beginning of 2008 (we know how well that worked out for one of them), Slovakia joined at the beginning of 2009 and Estonia followed in 2011. But though Croatia recently joined the European Union to much fanfare, and though other Balkan nations are anxious to follow suit into the European Union, there’s little Balkan sentiment to join the eurozone, nor is there an incredible amount of appetite from other more established EU members, like the United Kingdom, Denmark or Sweden, or newer central European countries.

It’s a different story in the Baltic states, though, and it’s not hard to see why — for small states that were swept into the Soviet Union for much of the 20th century, eurozone membership is as much about geopolitical strategy as about economics. It explains why the only other European country on target to join the eurozone anytime soon is Lithuania, the third and final Baltic nation, which hopes to join the euro in January 2015.

But the specter of Russian domination doesn’t explain everything — after all, Poland is gently backing away from joining the euro, and its history with Russia is also complicated (though perhaps balanced by an equally complicated relationship with Germany). Moreover, even Latvian nationalism in the face of valid concerns about Russian influence hasn’t kept the decision to join the eurozone from becoming incredibly unpopular, and polls show that a majority of Latvian voters oppose the decision to replace the Latvian lats with the euro by a nearly two-to-one margin. Continue reading Despite risks, Latvia (and all the Baltic states) still wants to join the eurozone →

Luxembourg

The beginning of the end of the Juncker era in Luxembourg — and possibly in Europe

July 10, 2013 Kevin Lees 2 Comments

An astounding scandal in Luxembourg is bringing to light the unfettered abuses of the small country’s secret service and, though its longtime prime minister Jean-Claude Juncker has disclaimed knowledge of the worst abuses, the debate over whether Juncker shares ‘political responsibility’ for the misdeeds has potentially ended Juncker’s remarkable three decades of domestic political dominance — Juncker has announced that his government will resign tomorrow in order to bring forward general elections that were originally expected next spring.

After facing a spectacular loss in a vote of no confidence from both his opponents and coalition allies in Luxembourg’s parliament, the D’Chamber (Chamber of Deputies), Juncker agreed to call early elections as soon as October. Despite speculation that Juncker might resign as prime minister today during his parliamentary testimony over oversight — or lack thereof — of Luxembourg’s secret service and intelligence scandal, he instead challenged his opponents to bring his government down when his coalition partners balked at Juncker’s testimony disclaiming direct responsibility for the abuses, detailed in a parliamentary report presented last Friday. Only after facing certain defeat in a no-confidence vote did Juncker acquiesce to his government’s resignation, and he has not indicated that he hopes to step away from the premiership permanently.

That means Juncker (pictured above), until earlier this year the president of the Eurogroup, may well lead his longtime dominant Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei (CSV, Christian Social People’s Party) in the next elections, but he will do so from a position of uncharacteristic weakness. An ignominious fall from power could endanger his hopes to succeed current EC president José Manuel Barroso in October 2014 when Barroso’s decade leading the Commission is set to expire.

So what is it that has turned Luxembourg upside down?

As Luxembourgian commentator Jerry Weyer explained earlier this year at his blog (his live updates of today’s parliamentary hearing on Twitter have been incredibly insightful), the scandal focuses on the role of the Service de renseignement de l’Etat luxembourgeois (SREL), the secret service / intelligence agency of Luxembourg. SREL has been up to quite a bit of mischief in Luxembourg, including illegal wiretapping and surveillance of various groups ranging from leftist and green political activists to suspected Islamic terrorists. It has also been alleged to have tried to blackmail homosexual individuals and involved in cover-up operations related to the investigation of the ‘Bommeleeër’ inquiry into a mysterious 1984 terrorist bomb attack in Luxembourg.

The scandal hit headlines late last year when it was revealed that an SREL official illegally recorded a conversation between Juncker and Luxembourg’s grand duke, Henri. That revelation led to further disclosures about SREL abuses of power over the years and to increasingly sharp questions about why Juncker continued to protect the SREL from public inquiry, even when it became clear that he knew about its transgressions (such as, for example, the SREL’s illegal taping of Juncker’s own private conversations). Furthermore, as Juncker has claimed he was unaware of additional abuses, he’s faced tough questions about whether he was too focused on European governance to provide adequate leadership in Luxembourg.

Given that Juncker has been in office since 1995 — five years longer than Grand Duke Henri has served as Luxembourg’s head of state — it has been nearly inconceivable to think about what a post-Juncker Luxembourg might mean, but it’s quickly something that’s become a reality as rivals to Juncker within both the opposition and within his own coalition start to vie for position as Juncker’s position has become increasingly untenable.

Some background is in order — after all, Luxembourg isn’t necessarily the most familiar country to U.S. audiences — or even European audiences who are much more familiar with Juncker’s role with respect to the Eurogroup and the eurozone.

Luxembourg, the tiny grand duchy (the world’s only existing 21st century grand duchy) nudged to the south of Belgium, to the west of Germany and to the northeast of France, is home to just under 550,000 citizens, making it the second-smallest European Union member after Malta in both terms of population and area. Its European pedigree, however, is undisputed — it was one of the six founders of the European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s that served as the forerunner to the European Union. As a small European country where French and German are both official languages alongside the native Luxembourgish, it has long served an important role smoothing relations between its two neighbors, which have historically served as the twin engines of EU growth and reform.

Consistently pro-European, Luxembourg’s voters approved the ill-fated European constitution in July 2005 with 56% in support of the constitution — and in support of Juncker, who pledged to resign if Luxembourgers opposed the effort — just weeks after two failed referenda in France and the Netherlands.

Juncker’s predecessor and mentor, Jacques Santer, Luxembourg’s prime minister from 1984 to 1995, served as president of the European Commission from 1995 to 1999. Santer played a key role in negotiating the Single European Act of 1986 that fully brought the European single market into effect. Santer, along with every other member of the European Commission, resigned en masse in 1999 over corruption among a handful of European commissioners, though Santer himself was never implicated directly with wrongdoing.

Before assuming the premiership from Santer, Juncker previously served as minister of labour from 1984 to 1989 and as finance minister from 1989 throughout the next two decades. In fact, Juncker continued to serve simultaneously as finance minister, prime minister and Eurogroup president until 2009, when Juncker’s CSV colleague, his longtime justice minister Luc Frieden, was appointed finance minister. In his role as Santer’s finance minister, Juncker became one of the chief architects of the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht and the single currency that Maastricht brought into being. More recently, Juncker was instrumental in formalizing the role of the Eurogroup, the group of finance ministers from each member of the eurozone, and he served as the first Eurogroup president from 2005 until earlier this year, when Dutch finance minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem was chosen to replace Juncker.

It’s not an exaggeration to argue that no one in European policymaking circles today has more experience and responsibility for the creation, rollout and enactment of the single currency than Juncker, and he played a crucial role in more recent debates over European bailouts for beleaguered Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal.

From an initial industrial economy based largely on steel production after World War II, Luxembourg has developed a modern, post-industrial economy that depends in large part on financial services today. With a GDP per capita of nearly $80,000, the tiny nation is by far the richest in the European Union. That hasn’t protected Luxembourg from the broader economic trends that have swept the eurozone — it’s notched only tepid GDP growth since an initial contraction in 2009, though GDP contracted by 1.6% year-over-year in the first quarter of 2013 and unemployment has edged up to nearly 7%.

Its head of state, Grand Duke Henri, is essentially a figurehead, especially after the Luxembourgian parliament clarified that the Grand Duke’s signature is not necessary to enact laws after Henri controversially announced that he would not sign a 2008 law regarding euthanasia.

Juncker’s center-right, Christian democratic CSV has long dominated Luxembourgian politics, and all but one of Luxembourg’s prime ministers have come from the CSV since World War II. The CSV controls 26 of the 60 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and during Juncker’s time in office, the CSV has formed governing coalitions with each of its chief rivals, the center-left, social democratic Lëtzebuerger Sozialistesch Arbechterpartei (LSAP, Luxembourg Socialist Workers’ Party) and the center-right, liberal Demokratesch Partei (DP, Democratic Party). While that has perhaps led to an extraordinary amount of continuity within Luxembourg’s government, critics charge that the CSV’s political hegemony has led to a cozy environment where SREL misdeeds and other abuses have gone unpunished.

Though it’s been the CSV’s coalition partner for the past decade, it is the LSAP that has brought about early elections by threatening to bring down the government with a vote of no confidence. Its leader Alex Bodry announced last Friday that the party would push for either Juncker’s resignation or fresh elections.

While the LSAP currently holds 13 seats, the Democratic Party holds nine seats and it’s currently the largest party sitting in opposition, though it has joined the CSV in government between 1999 and 2004. Its president, Xavier Bettel, also the mayor of Luxembourg City, has taken just as critical a line against Juncker, accusing the prime minister of having failed to bring SREL misdeeds to light for public inquiry. Bettel and the Democratic Party are especially well-placed to succeed in the next elections. A poll earlier this spring showed that the young, openly gay Bettel is now more popular than Juncker, though the CSV continues to widely outpace the LSAP and the Democrats, though that could change if Luxembourgian voters want to punish Juncker — for the SREL abuses or more broadly for the sluggish economy.

Three smaller parties also sit in opposition: Luxembourg’s Déi Gréng (Greens) hold seven seats; a nationalist conservative party, the Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei (Alternative Democratic Reform Party) holds four seats; and the far-left Déi Lénk (The Left) holds just one seat.

Egypt

Why the ultraconservative Salafi movement is now the key constituency in post-Morsi Egypt

July 9, 2013 Kevin Lees 2 Comments

With a level of speed breathtaking even for an Egyptian political crisis, the Egyptian military’s role has soured in record time since removing Mohammed Morsi from office last week.

On Monday, the Egyptian army gunned down protestors in favor of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, apparently killing at least 51 people in the process. That came after top Muslim Brotherhood leaders had been detained or arrested in the wake of Morsi’s ouster. It also comes after the new military-backed administration, headed by interim president Adly Mansour, all but announced (then all but retracted) the appointment of Mohamed ElBaradei, the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as the country’s new prime minister over the weekend.

Both the short-lived ElBaradei appointment and Monday’s brutality have now alienated one of the most surprisingly odd bedfellows out of the coalition that initially supported army chief Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi in pushing Morsi from office — the Salafi movement’s Al-Nour Party (حزب النور‎, Arabic for ‘Party of the Light’), an even more conservative group of Islamists that have long competed with the Muslim Brotherhood for influence in Egypt. Like other groups that have come to oppose Morsi over the past year, the Al-Nour Party has criticized Morsi for increasingly centralizing power within the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood, and their backing for Morsi’s removal last week provided El-Sisi and the Egyptian military crucial support from within Islamist ranks.

But in the wake of Monday’s deaths, the Al-Nour Party announced that it was suspending its participation in the ongoing negotiations over Egypt’s political future. Mansour has now signaled he may appoint Samir Radwan, a technocratic economist and short-lived finance minister in the final days of Hosni Mubarak’s government, as the new interim prime minister, and Mansour yesterday announced an ambitious timetable that would submit the Egyptian constitution to a review committee, submit any revisions to a constitutional referendum within three months, which in turn would be followed in two weeks by the election of a new Egyptian parliament and in three months by the election of a new Egyptian president.

Monday’s bloodshed has increased the pressure on Mansour to bring some semblance of calm to Egypt’s now-chaotic political crisis, with Morsi supporters and followers of the Muslim Brotherhood continuing to demand the restoration of the Morsi administration.

The Al-Nour Party’s leadership is walking a difficult line — on the one hand, it is now well-placed to influence events in post-Morsi Egypt; on the other hand, it’s long been split over how much support to provide Morsi as an Islamist president, some of its supporters opposed Morsi’s removal, and the Muslim Brotherhood will be quick to point out that the Al-Nour Party has turned on its fellow Islamists. By initially supporting last week’s coup but turning on the new transitional government this week, the Salafists may be trying to maneuver the best of both worlds. But after a year where the Al-Nour Party has already splintered, its controversial support for the Egyptian military may shatter it further.

But regardless of whether Mansour can somehow bring the Salafists back into the ongoing political process, and regardless of whether the actual Al-Nour Party can manage to form a united front, their Salafist supporters have now become the key constituency in the latest act of Egypt’s existential drama. After decades of disdain for active politicking, the Salafi movement has shown itself to be a relatively canny political actor in the post-revolution Egypt, and it makes Al-Nour’s leader, Younes Makhioun (pictured above), one of Egypt’s most important politicians.

With the Muslim Brotherhood rejecting Mansour’s timetable and continuing to agitate for Morsi’s return, it’s not clear whether the Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party will even participate in any upcoming elections, even if Mansour manages to avoid delays and carry out three sets of free and fair elections in the next six months. It’s likewise equally unclear whether El-Sisi and the Egyptian military will even let the Muslim Brotherhood contest the elections uninhibited.

Having avoided the taint of being part of Morsi’s ill-fated government and all of its failures — from the November 2012 push to force a new constitution into effect to the ongoing failures of economic policy — the Al-Nour Party stands a strong chance of picking up many of the Muslim Brotherhood’s disillusioned voters as an Islamist alternative.

So who are the Salafists and what would their rise mean for Egypt? Continue reading Why the ultraconservative Salafi movement is now the key constituency in post-Morsi Egypt →

Baja California, Mexico

Why the PAN’s victory in Baja California is good news for Mexican democracy

July 8, 2013 Kevin Lees Leave a comment

Francisco ‘Kiko’ Vega de Lamadrid has emerged as the winner of Sunday’s gubernatorial election in the Mexican state of Baja California, giving the conservative Mexican opposition a major boost in a high-profile election a year after its crushing defeat in the July 2012 Mexican presidential election.

Vega (pictured above), a former Tijuana mayor, a Mexican congressman from 2009 to 2012, and a former finance secretary of Baja California in the late 1990s, led an electoral coalition dominated by the conservative Partido Acción Nacional (PAN, National Action Party). Initial results showed Vega having won around 47.15% of the vote to just 44.15% for Fernando Castro Trenti, the candidate of the governing Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI, Institutional Revolutionary Party).

That means not only that Vega will be the sixth consecutive PAN governor of Baja California, but that the PAN will continue to hold onto one of the party’s most symbolic strongholds a year after the PRI’s young and photogenic Enrique Peña Nieto won the Mexican presidency, giving the PAN a boost after a year of infighting and internal distractions. A PAN loss in Baja California would have been nothing short of a complete disaster for the party and for its current leader, Gustavo Madero.

The entire peninsula of Baja California is technically divided into two states — Baja California and Baja California Sur — and the state’s population of around 3.3 million means that it’s not among México’s largest states.

But there are a lot of reasons why Baja California is nonetheless an important state in Mexican politics.

One obvious reason is its proximity to the United States. The sprawling border cities of Mexicali and Tijuana have been focal points of migration of workers and products, both legal and illicit, from México to the United States, for decades at a time when U.S. policy is focused on immigration reform. Both the peninsula and the state are among the most popular tourist destinations for U.S. citizens drawn to Baja’s beachfront bounty — although foreigners can hold 50-year interests in Mexican property in trust, foreigners are still banned from owning beachfront property in Baja California under laws dating back to the Mexican Revolution, despite recent legislation to ease property restrictions.

But Baja California also plays an important role in the development of Mexican democracy — it was in Baja California that a Mexican opposition party first won a gubernatorial race after decades of PRI dominance in what had been México’s one-party state since the 1920s. When the PAN’s candidate, a young local businessman named Ernesto Ruffo Appel, won the July 1989 gubernatorial race, then-president Carlos Salinas acknowledged the PRI’s defeat on election night, thereby propelling the PAN to its first major shot at power in Mexican history.

It’s not difficult to draw a direct line from that night to ever greater milestones for Mexican democracy — the 1992 elections that saw the PAN win further gubernatorial victories; the 1997 elections that brought the leftist opposition Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD, Party of the Democratic Revolution) to power in the Distrito Federal, where the PRD has essentially governed México City ever since; and, of course, the 2000 presidential election that delivered the Mexican presidency to the PAN’s Vicente Fox.

Though Fox’s successor, Felipe Calderón, followed him to the presidency in 2006, the PAN’s 12-year hold on the Mexican presidency collapsed after Peña Nieto’s victory, which followed a decade-long project of rebranding the PRI’s role in a 21st century, multi-party democratic México. The PAN’s candidate, Josefina Vázquez Mota, finished far behind Peña Nieto with just 25% of the vote and weakened by internal disputes within the PAN, despite the historic nature of her candidacy — Vázquez Mota was the first female major-party candidate for the Mexican presidency.

Vega’s victory gives the PAN something to celebrate and an opportunity to pivot from the nadir of its 2012 effort and the ensuing internal squabbling that’s followed, which ultimately bodes well for balancing México’s various political forces in advance of over a dozen gubernatorial races in 2014 and midterm congressional elections in 2015.

The victory also boosts Peña Nieto’s national agenda, the so-called Pacto for México among all three parties in the Mexican Congress, where no party holds an absolute majority of seats — the PRI actually lost 30 seats in the lower house, the Cámara de Diputados, in last year’s simultaneous legislative elections. Peña Nieto is planning to push for tax and energy sector reform in coming months, and he’ll need the PAN’s support in order to carry out those reforms, especially given the Mexican left’s suspicion of any moves toward private investment in Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), Mexico’s state-owned oil company.

That’s because the PAN’s victory will, for the time being, steady Madero’s leadership, who signed the Pacto with Peña Nieto earlier this year. Although Calderón himself pushed for tax reform last decade (it was blocked by the PRD and the PRI at the time) and both reforms are largely in line with the PAN’s free-market economic views, the Pacto has divided Mexico’s conservatives, who were already split between maderistas and calderonistas (today, corderistas) following the December 2012 election for the PAN’s presidency between Madero and Ernesto Cordero, a longtime Calderón loyalist and former Calderón finance minister.

In May, Madero demoted Cordero, who has been more skeptical about the Pacto, from his role as the PAN’s caucus leader in the Senato, the Mexican Congress’s upper house. Cordero, a longtime Calderón loyalist, has been more pessimistic about the Pacto than Madero or Santiago Creel, also a senator and formerly Fox’s interior minister. Both Cordero and Creel contested the PAN’s 2012 presidential primary against Vázquez Mota, and all three politicians plus Madero could seek the presidency in 2018.

Continue reading Why the PAN’s victory in Baja California is good news for Mexican democracy →

Egypt

ElBaradei set to become interim Egyptian prime minister in post-Morsi gamble for ‘reset’

July 6, 2013 Kevin Lees 1 Comment

UPDATE: Egyptian officials are now distancing themselves from earlier reports that Mohamed ElBaradei will be Egypt’s next prime minister — that doesn’t incredibly change the analysis, though. ElBaradei’s ties to the West, not to mention the other drawbacks mentioned below, help us understand why Egypt’s new military-backed government may have had second thoughts about ElBaradei, especially if they are hoping to bring Salafist Al-Nour Party leaders into the fold.

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Mohamed ElBaradei is set to become Egypt’s interim prime minister just four days after Mohammed Morsi was deposed as from the Egyptian presidency by the country’s armed forces.

ElBaradei, the former director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, is a well-known figure whose international credibility runs far deeper than that of newly-installed interim president Adly Mansour, formerly the chief justice of the Egyptian constitutional court. His selection as prime minister will bring instant gravitas to the emerging post-Morsi regime in Egypt, at least vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

But deploying ElBaradei into power is not risk-free — for either the new government or for ElBaradei’s reputation.

The danger is that his selection won’t be enough to ameliorate the governance crisis that has now accelerated with the Egyptian military’s decision to remove Morsi. After all, though Morsi’s government had few allies after its troubled year in office, it’s hard to believe that the Muslim Brotherhood still doesn’t command the largest bloc of supporters within Egypt, and their wrath at the military’s turn against the Muslim Brotherhood may not be soothed by the appointment of any caretaker, no matter his seniority or even-handedness. ElBaradei’s appointment comes just a day after pro-Morsi supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood staged a day of protest — the ‘Friday of rejection’ — demanding the return of Morsi to the presidency that met with tense, sometimes violent, resistance from the Egyptian military. It’s too early to predict that Egypt is descending into a kind of civil war — despite a troubling lynching of four Shi’a Muslims last month, the largely Sunni Egypt doesn’t really feature strong Sunni-Shi’a schisms that have propelled sectarian violence more recently in countries like Iraq and Syria, and most Egyptians, even its more conservative Islamists, hold the military in high regard, for now at least. But there’s no guarantee that ElBaradei can keep political violence from spiraling further out of control, propelling ever more turmoil to Egyptian industry, trade and tourism.

Even if no one will miss the ineptitude of the Morsi government, ElBaradei’s new power doesn’t come imbued with much of a mandate. Though Egypt’s post-Mubarak transition was troubled from its inception, the successful conduct of free and fair presidential elections last summer was a key milestone on Egypt’s road toward a more democratic state. While it’s true that the anti-Morsi protests had ballooned to a size even larger than those against Mubarak in February 2011, the more relevant factor is that Mubarak was never elected in a free election the way that Morsi was only a year ago. So while political scientists debate whether last week’s events amounted to a coup (spoiler: yes, of course it was a coup, even if the U.S. administration doesn’t use the word ‘coup’), ElBaradei and his military supporters will come to power having undermined the most visible democratic credential that Egyptians could boast since the Arab Spring began.

By contrast, though French president François Hollande remains incredibly unpopular after just one year into a five-year term, no one seriously thinks the French military is set to remove him from office to install a center-right president in France. Moreover, ElBaradei will become Egypt’s new leader after having pulled out of last year’s presidential race, and it was not entirely clear that ElBaradei would have won in any event. But it would have been better for the country today if ElBaradei had remained in the race to make a full-throated case for a secular, liberal democratic Egypt and to bring the fight to Morsi on the basis of the merits of his own ideas, not on the coattails of the military’s guns.

Unlike former foreign minister and Arab Council secretary-general Amr Moussa and former air force chief Ahmed Shafiq, ElBaradei is not tainted as felool — the ‘remnants’ of the government that Hosni Mubarak led from the 1980s until 2011. But as the Tamarod (‘Rebellion’) movement has gathered steam in its efforts to oust Morsi, ElBaradei has managed to unite a disparate coalition of anti-Morsi interests, including Moussa, much of the former military establishment, elements of the so-called ‘deep state’ and supporters of former presidential candidate Hamdeen Sabahi, whose leftist, Nasser-style nationalism nearly vaulted him into last June’s presidential runoff. If Monsour, ElBaradei and the new interim government succeed in organizing a new presidential election, Sabahi would certainly be the frontrunner to win it (unless ElBaradei himself runs, though he’s said he’s not interested in the presidency for himself).

As ElBaradei has noted in the days leading up to and following Morsi’s forced removal, the Morsi presidency was far from perfect — ElBaradei had routinely accused Morsi of becoming a ‘pharaoh’ in office, and he mocked Morsi’s Islamist agenda by noting acidly that ‘you can’t eat sharia.’ Though Morsi won only a narrow victory last June over Shafiq, he triumphed by assembling a broader coalition that transcended his own Muslim Brotherhood supporters, and, in recognition of that reality, Morsi initially called for a broad inclusion of diverse views in formulating policies in office. One of his first steps in August 2012, in firing longtime army chief and defense minister Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, and replacing him with Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi, was an incredibly successful masterstroke, temporarily at least, in marrying the political interests of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian military. Ironically, it was El-Sisi, who owed his position as commander-in-chief of the Egyptian armed forces to Morsi, who green-lighted the action that toppled Morsi.

But as Bassem Sabry explained in illuminating detail on Thursday in Al-Monitor, the clear point at which Morsi lost control over the country was his ill-fated decision last November to push through a vote on the country’s new constitution. Continue reading ElBaradei set to become interim Egyptian prime minister in post-Morsi gamble for ‘reset’ →

Egypt

In Depth: Egypt

July 6, 2013 Kevin Lees Leave a comment

<See below Suffragio’s preview of Egypt’s July 2013 coup, followed by a real-time listing of all coverage of Egyptian politics.>

With the removal of Mohammed Morsi from the Egyptian presidency just days after completing his first year as Egypt’s first and only democratically elected president, the country seems set for a restart of its political, governance and social institutions at a time when its economic foundations continue to crumble.

Supported by the national military, interim president Adly Mansour and interim prime minister Mohamed ElBaradei, the former director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, will now face the task of pacifying a country still reeling from the effects of its February 2011 revolution and overthrow of strongman Hosni Mubarak, an elongated transition headed by the military’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, and an experiment in a year of government by a duly elected president with strong ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Most immediately, Mansour and ElBaradei have pledged to hold new elections for both president and Egypt’s parliament, though they will face immediate concerns with respect to the Egyptian economy.

As Egypt begins to negotiate yet another phase of political and social uncertainty, you can follow Suffragio‘s prior coverage of the previous presidential election and the key moments of the Morsi administration below.

— July 6, 2013

Photo credit to Breeze Giannasio.

* * * * *

Please note below Suffragio‘s prior coverage of Egyptian politics:

Egypt election results: Egypt has a new pharaoh
May 29, 2014

Voting will continue until the morale (and turnout) improves
May 27, 2014

How Egypt’s El-Sisi out-Nassered (and out-Sabahi’ed) Sabahi
May 23, 2014

Egypt’s El-Araby: ‘We don’t have an energy strategy’
April 10, 2014

El-Sisi finally announces presidential candidacy in Egypt
March 31, 2014

The official unofficial El-Sisi presidential continues in Egypt
March 21, 2014

Mubarakization-watch: Egypt referendum results
January 22, 2014

Egypt’s constitutional referendum enshrines re-Mubarakiztion
January 14, 2014

Egyptian massacre, ‘state of emergency,’ mocks Arab Spring with return to Mubarak-era tactics
August 14, 2013

Egypt 2013 is not Algeria 1991 (whew!), but that’s bad news for Egyptian democracy
August 6, 2013

Why the ultraconservative Salafi movement is now the key constituency in post-Morsi Egypt
July 9, 2013

ElBaradei set to become interim Egyptian prime minister in post-Morsi gamble
July 6, 2013

What comes next for Egypt
July 3, 2013

Will Egypt and Ethiopia come to blows over the Renaissance Dam and water politics?
June 26, 2013

El-Mursi Hegazy and the terrible, horrible, no good, very bad Egyptian economy
January 9, 2013

Morsi’s Egypt spirals further into chaos with apparent Dec. 15 constitutional referendum
December 3, 2012

Morsi: ‘We’re learning. We’re learning how to be free.’
November 29, 2012

Egyptian president Morsi caught in the crossfire in embassy riots kerfuffle
September 13, 2012

Morsi, in firing defense minister, asserts presidential control over Egypt
August 13, 2012

Egypt’s new government sworn in today featuring continuity from SCAF transitional government
August 2, 2012

Morsi announces surprise choice as new Egyptian prime minister
July 24, 2012

Former Mubarak intelligence chief Omar Suleiman has died
July 19, 2012

Forget PIMCO’s Mohamed El-Erian — Egypt’s new PM is likely to be Mahmoud Abul-Eyoun
July 18, 2012

Morsi and Shafiq both declare victory in Egypt as SCAF moves put transition in doubt
June 20, 2012

Morsi responds to Egypt parliament’s dissolution
June 14, 2012

The SCAF strikes back a day before Egypt’s presidential runoff
June 14, 2012

Sabahi, moderates, revolutionaries, secularists: all left behind in Egyptian presidential runoff
June 13, 2012

Final first-round Egypt election results
May 29, 2012

Sabahi wins Cairo, but not by enough to enter runoff
May 25, 2012

Felool me once, shame on you — Morsi-Shafiq nightmare runoff starts to take shape
May 25, 2012

Early returns indicate a possible Morsi-Shafiq runoff
May 25, 2012

Egypt runoff: Who is Ahmed Shafiq?
May 25, 2012

Egypt runoff: Who is Mohammed Morsi?
May 25, 2012

Television ads in the Egyptian presidential race
May 24, 2012

Second day of voting ends in Egyptian presidential election
May 24, 2012

Abdoul Fatouh v. Moussa v. Morsi v. Sabahi v. Shafiq: five vie for two runoff slots in unpredictable Egyptian race
May 23, 2012

Egypt

In Depth: Egypt

July 6, 2013 Kevin Lees Leave a comment

Most immediately, Mansour and ElBaradei have pledged to hold new elections for both president and Egypt’s parliament, though they will face immediate concerns with respect to the Egyptian economy.

Photo credit to Breeze Giannasio.

* * * * *

Egyptian massacre, ‘state of emergency,’ mocks Arab Spring with return to Mubarak-era tactics
August 14, 2013

Egypt 2013 is not Algeria 1991 (whew!), but that’s bad news for Egyptian democracy
August 6, 2013

Why the ultraconservative Salafi movement is now the key constituency in post-Morsi Egypt
July 9, 2013

ElBaradei set to become interim Egyptian prime minister in post-Morsi gamble
July 6, 2013

What comes next for Egypt
July 3, 2013

Will Egypt and Ethiopia come to blows over the Renaissance Dam and water politics?
June 26, 2013

El-Mursi Hegazy and the terrible, horrible, no good, very bad Egyptian economy
January 9, 2013

Morsi’s Egypt spirals further into chaos with apparent Dec. 15 constitutional referendum
December 3, 2012

Morsi: ‘We’re learning. We’re learning how to be free.’
November 29, 2012

Egyptian president Morsi caught in the crossfire in embassy riots kerfuffle
September 13, 2012