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Eight lessons from the 2017 Dutch election results

Twenty-eight parties were vying for 150 seats in the Dutch House of Representatives. (Emmanuel Dunand / AFP)

Orange may be the new black.

But as it turns out, orange is also the new bulwark for liberal democracy.

Mark Rutte’s governing center-right, liberal Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD, the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) performed better than polls predicted in The Netherlands, and Rutte will now return as Dutch prime minister — perhaps through the end of the decade — as head of a multi-party governing coalition.

Conversely, Wednesday’s election amounted to a disappointing result for Geert Wilders and the sharply anti-Europe, anti-Islam and anti-immigration Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV, Party for Freedom), which blew a longtime polling lead that it had held from the middle of 2015 up to just a couple of weeks ago.

As Dutch voters took a harder look at the campaign, however, they turned away from Wilders’s populism and to the balmier vision of Rutte’s VVD. But they also turned to three other parties that ranged from conservative to liberal to progressive. Indeed, over 65% of the Dutch electorate supported parties that are, essentially, in favor of moderate policymaking, European integration and basic decency to immigrants.

Given that the Dutch election is the first of a half-dozen key European national elections in 2017, all of which are taking place in the dual shadows of last year’s Brexit referendum and Donald Trump’s election in the United States, everyone was watching this vote in particular as a harbinger for European elections this year.

So what does today’s result mean? Here are the top eight takeaways from election night.
Continue reading Eight lessons from the 2017 Dutch election results

Meet Jesse Klaver, the 30-year-old Dutch leader of the surging Green-Left Party

Jesse Klaver, the youthful leader of GroenLinks, hopes to make his party a player for the first time in the Dutch House of Representatives. (Facebook)

The first thing you notice about Jesse Klaver is just how much he looks like Canada’s prime minister, Justin Trudeau.

The second thing you notice is that he’s so young — at 30 years old, he’s a full decade and a half younger than Trudeau and between 12 and 24 years younger than the other major Dutch party leaders.

But the more important point about Klaver, who has also been likened to John F. Kennedy, is that he’s making his leftist GroenLinks (Green-Left) a genuine player in Dutch politics for the first time since it came into existence in 1989. If polls are correct, GroenLinks will surge from just four seats to as many as 20 seats after the Dutch electorate votes in two weeks.

Klaver is the freshest face among the half-dozen or so party leaders who will be forced to work together after the March 15 election to forge a new government. Unlike in past elections, GroenLinks could be a key player in what will likely be a four- or five-party coalition that forms the next Dutch government. It’s very unlikely that Klaver would agree to bring his party into any coalition headed by current prime minister Mark Rutte. Nevertheless, Klaver’s party, which is as firmly pro-European as Rutte and likely the next Rutte-led government, could offer in opposition an alternative anti-austerity voice than the populist Geert Wilders.

Klaver’s party is locked in a tight contest among potentially five different parties for third place, behind Rutte’s center-right liberal Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD, People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) and Wilders’s the anti-Islam, anti-immigrant and eurosceptic Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV, Party for Freedom).

Wilders has dominated news coverage of the campaign both in The Netherlands and abroad, with his party surging to a formidable polling lead two years ago. Wilders, who pledges to ‘Make The Netherlands Great Again,’ promises a Trump-style rupture to halt the flow of refugees into The Netherlands and the flow of sovereignty from Amsterdam to Brussels. Wilders, like Trump and other far-right nationalists across Europe, is giving voice to a growing cadre of displaced and dispirited working-class voters who might have voted for left-wing parties a decade or two ago.

Though many polls forecast that the PVV will win the largest number of seats in the 150-member Tweede Kamer (House of Representatives), recent surveys show that the VVD’s support is plateauing or even, within the last week, falling. Even if Wilders and the populists do win the largest bloc of seats in the House, none of the other major Dutch parties are willing to entertain joining a Wilders-led coalition.

All of which means that the threat of an illiberal and xenophobic Dutch government, in 2017 at least, are far-fetched.

Indeed, if the election were held today, it would be Klaver’s GroenLinks (and not Wilders’s PVV) that could make the largest net gains in the election, contrary to conventional wisdom. Continue reading Meet Jesse Klaver, the 30-year-old Dutch leader of the surging Green-Left Party

As spring 2017 vote approaches, populist Wilders leading Dutch polls

The majority of polls show that Geert Wilders is leading in advance of the next Dutch election. (Geoff Pugh / The Telegraph)
The majority of polls show that Geert Wilders is leading in advance of the next Dutch election. (Geoff Pugh / The Telegraph)

Europe, it’s safe to say, was focused on a lot of threats in the last month — a polarized British electorate that voted to leave the European Union, ongoing worries about the Italian banking sector, yet another terrorist attack in France, a failed military coup in Turkey.Netherlands Flag Icon

No one has spent much time considering the possibility that political instability could come to the Netherlands, a northern European country that was one of the six founding members of what is today the European Union.

As Americans and non-Americans alike turn to Cleveland to watch the unorthodox spectacle of Donald Trump’s formal coronation as the Republican Party’s presidential nominee, one of the Europeans in attendance hopes to become the next prime minister of The Netherlands. And he has reason for optimism. According to polls, Geert Wilders’s Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV, Party for Freedom) could win the next Dutch election, which must take place before March 15.

If those polls hold, Wilders, who has been a fixture in Dutch politics for more than a decade, would win the election by a robust margin, dwarfing the more traditional center-right, liberal Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD, People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) of prime minister Mark Rutte.

Wilders has enthusiastically embraced Trump at a time when nationalist populism is on the rise throughout the United States as well as Europe, tweeting out ‘Make The Netherlands Great Again’ to supporters earlier this spring. He’s arrived with a splash at the Republican National Convention, invited by the Tennessee delegation. As an outspoken critic of immigration, Islam and the European Union, Wilders hopes that he can finally break through to an election victory in March and perhaps, at long last, fulfill his dream of becoming prime minister.

Far-right Dutch leader Geert Wilders poses for a photo with Tennessee senator Bob Corker, chair of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee. (Twitter)
Far-right Dutch leader Geert Wilders poses for a photo with Tennessee senator Bob Corker, chair of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee. (Twitter)

Wilders inherited much of the support that Pim Fortuyn once commanded before the latter’s assassination in 2002. Wilders is known mostly for his outright rejection of Islam and his quest to terminate all immigration from Muslim-majority countries into the Netherlands. Though Wilders often denies links to other European far-right parties by pointing to his more liberal record on economic policy, he is clearly the Dutch analog to figures like Britain’s Nigel Farage and France’s Marine Le Pen. Wilders is  currently on trial in the Netherlands for inciting hatred as a result of disparaging comments he made about the Dutch Moroccan minority, though he wears the legal dispute as a badge of honor — a politician willing to speak the truth about Muslims. For more than a decade, following the assassinations of Fortuyn and filmmaker Theo Van Gogh (the latter killed by a Dutch citizen of Moroccan descent in 2004), Wilders lives under strict protection from potential threats.

Continue reading As spring 2017 vote approaches, populist Wilders leading Dutch polls

Three ways Europe and Greece could blow their last chance at a debt deal

varoufakiseuclidPhoto credit to EPA/BGNES.

The world woke up to the news Monday morning that outspoken Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis had, at long lost, been dismissed by his prime minister, Alexis Tsipras.Greece Flag Icon

Varoufakis (pictured above, right, behind Greece’s new finance minister, Euclid Tsakalotos) had become, to say the least, a brake on negotiations with the Eurogroup, even though his widespread popularity and strident anti-austerity boosted Tsipras’s government to a stunning victory in Sunday’s debt negotiations referendum, whereby 61.31% of voters rejected a prior plan offered by Greece’s European creditors.

European officials struggled to reach consensus with Varoufakis, who just last week, in the middle of the rushed referendum campaign, referred to his European ministerial colleagues as ‘terrorists.’ Tsakalotos, an Oxford-trained economist, is expected to take a more mild-mannered approach, and he already supplanted Varoufakis as Greece’s chief negotiator back in April. That was, however, only to the extent anyone could supplant the motorbike-riding, free-wheeling Varoufakis, who gave his final press conference as finance minister Sunday night in a t-shirt.

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RELATED: If Grexit comes,
Greece will have wasted five years in depression

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Varoufakis’s resignation, along with a pledge of national unity across Greece’s mainstream domestic political spectrum, breathed new life into hopes for last-minute talks for a third bailout, allowing the country to reopen its illiquid and perhaps insolvent banks, lift (at least partially) capital controls that have limited daily cash withdrawals to €60, restore liquidity to ATMs that have run out of cash altogether, address Greece’s €1.6 billion default on June 30 to the International Monetary Fund and meet a July 20 deadline to make a €3.5 billion payment to the European Central Bank.

For all the celebration that followed the resounding ‘no’ vote in Sunday’s referendum, the coming Sunday could bring financial austerity far more severe than Greece has known in the past five years, marked by a nearly 30% drop in GDP growth and a 26% unemployment rate. Failure to reach a deal could result in a shortage of cash, food, medicine and so many other necessities to the extent that European leaders are whispering that Greece could require humanitarian aid.

Notwithstanding the dire consequences, a deal is not necessarily likely — or even possible. If they’re lucky, the European Union has five days to prevent Grexit. Here are four reasons why it will be so difficult in the hours ahead.  Continue reading Three ways Europe and Greece could blow their last chance at a debt deal

If Grexit comes, Greece will have wasted five years in depression

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Photo credit to Orestis Panagiotou / EPA.

If you think the past nine days have been tense, just wait.Greece Flag Icon

For all the uncertainty and mistrust that have characterized Greek-EU relations since Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras suddenly announced a snap referendum last Friday, the week ahead promises to reach ever dizzying heights of suspense after Greek voters delivered a strong endorsement to Tsipras by rejecting the terms of the most recent deal on offer from the Eurogroup — over 61% of the electorate voted no (or ‘oxi’). The result, whether Tsipras admits it or not, essentially begins the process by which Greece will eventually leave the eurozone.

There are no winners here.

Tsipras and the far-left SYRIZA (Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς, the Coalition of the Radical Left) took power after January’s parliamentary elections on the mutually incompatible pledge of keeping Greece in the eurozone while demanding more lenient conditions from the country’s creditors. In so doing, Tspiras miscalculated European goodwill. It wasn’t unreasonable for Tsipras and finance minister Yanis Varoufakis to argue that Greece’s debt load is unsustainable. Moreover, even plenty of orthodox economists, including many at the International Monetary Fund, one of Greece’s creditors, admit that years of austerity have exacerbated economic conditions — GDP contraction of nearly 30% since 2008, a 26% unemployment rate and a nearly 50% youth unemployment rate. But the erratic and amateurish approach of the Greek government, capped by Tsipras’s 11th-hour decision to call the July 5th referendum, destroyed what little goodwill remained for his government.

There’s still time — even now — for Greece and the rest of Europe to reach a deal. But the complete lack of trust between Tsipras’s government and the entirety of the rest of the eurozone’s leadership makes it much less likely to happen. The complete breakdown in trust between Tsipras and even sympathetic European leaders must certainly rank among the most troubling casualties of the past nine days. Continue reading If Grexit comes, Greece will have wasted five years in depression

What a Eurogroup-brokered deal with Greece might look like

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At times this week, it has felt nearly like the European Union was brokering a bailout of Ukrainian debt, while working to negotiate a ceasefire with Greece.European_UnionGreece Flag Icon

But as Greece’s new left-wing government and the Eurogroup, the collection of eurozone finance ministers, work over the weekend for a new Greek debt deal to float Greece’s treasury for the next two years (or thereabouts), there are glimmers of hope on both sides that a deal might possibly emerge. Negotiations continue as the February 28 deadline approaches, when Greece’s current bailout program is scheduled to end.

So what might that deal ultimately be? Above all, any deal that attempts to put Greece on a long-term path to prosperity needs to start from the notion that its debt burden of nearly 175% of GDP growth is simply unsustainable. You might not hear that in public from figures like German chancellor Angela Merkel, German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble, European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker or Eurogroup president and Dutch finance minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem, but it’s likely another story in private.

No matter how many cuts successive governments make to future budgets, the cost of servicing that debt will cripple its ability to provide the same level of public services to Greek citizens — especially at a time when unemployment remains so high. (Not everyone has the view, however, that the Greek debt burden is so incredibly unsustainable).

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RELATED: A Russian bailout may have always been Plan B for Tsipras

RELATED: Seven lessons from the Greek election results

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Here’s an outline of what to expect — perhaps as soon as early Monday morning: Continue reading What a Eurogroup-brokered deal with Greece might look like

The beginning of the end of the Juncker era in Luxembourg — and possibly in Europe

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An astounding scandal in Luxembourg is bringing to light the unfettered abuses of the small country’s secret service and, though its longtime prime minister Jean-Claude Juncker has disclaimed knowledge of the worst abuses, the debate over whether Juncker shares ‘political responsibility’ for the misdeeds has potentially ended Juncker’s remarkable three decades of domestic political dominance — Juncker has announced that his government will resign tomorrow in order to bring forward general elections that were originally expected next spring.luxembourg

After facing a spectacular loss in a vote of no confidence from both his opponents and coalition allies in Luxembourg’s parliament, the D’Chamber (Chamber of Deputies), Juncker agreed to call early elections as soon as October.  Despite speculation that Juncker might resign as prime minister today during his parliamentary testimony over oversight — or lack thereof — of Luxembourg’s secret service and intelligence scandal, he instead challenged his opponents to bring his government down when his coalition partners balked at Juncker’s testimony disclaiming direct responsibility for the abuses, detailed in a parliamentary report presented last Friday.  Only after facing certain defeat in a no-confidence vote did Juncker acquiesce to his government’s resignation, and he has not indicated that he hopes to step away from the premiership permanently.

That means Juncker (pictured above), until earlier this year the president of the Eurogroup, may well lead his longtime dominant Chrëschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei (CSV, Christian Social People’s Party) in the next elections, but he will do so from a position of uncharacteristic weakness.  An ignominious fall from power could endanger his hopes to succeed current EC president José Manuel Barroso in October 2014 when Barroso’s decade leading the Commission is set to expire.

So what is it that has turned Luxembourg upside down?

As Luxembourgian commentator Jerry Weyer explained earlier this year at his blog (his live updates of today’s parliamentary hearing on Twitter have been incredibly insightful), the scandal focuses on the role of the Service de renseignement de l’Etat luxembourgeois (SREL), the secret service / intelligence agency of Luxembourg.  SREL has been up to quite a bit of mischief in Luxembourg, including illegal wiretapping and surveillance of various groups ranging from leftist and green political activists to suspected Islamic terrorists.  It has also been alleged to have tried to blackmail homosexual individuals and involved in cover-up operations related to the investigation of the ‘Bommeleeër’ inquiry into a mysterious 1984 terrorist bomb attack in Luxembourg.

The scandal hit headlines late last year when it was revealed that an SREL official illegally recorded a conversation between Juncker and Luxembourg’s grand duke, Henri.  That revelation led to further disclosures about SREL abuses of power over the years and to increasingly sharp questions about why Juncker continued to protect the SREL from public inquiry, even when it became clear that he knew about its transgressions (such as, for example, the SREL’s illegal taping of Juncker’s own private conversations).  Furthermore, as Juncker has claimed he was unaware of additional abuses, he’s faced tough questions about whether he was too focused on European governance to provide adequate leadership in Luxembourg.

Given that Juncker has been in office since 1995 — five years longer than Grand Duke Henri has served as Luxembourg’s head of state — it has been nearly inconceivable to think about what a post-Juncker Luxembourg might mean, but it’s quickly something that’s become a reality as rivals to Juncker within both the opposition and within his own coalition start to vie for position as Juncker’s position has become increasingly untenable.

Some background is in order — after all, Luxembourg isn’t necessarily the most familiar country to U.S. audiences — or even European audiences who are much more familiar with Juncker’s role with respect to the Eurogroup and the eurozone.

Luxembourg, the tiny grand duchy (the world’s only existing 21st century grand duchy) nudged to the south of Belgium, to the west of Germany and to the  northeast of France, is home to just under 550,000 citizens, making it the second-smallest European Union member after Malta in both terms of population and area.  Its European pedigree, however, is undisputed — it was one of the six founders of the European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s that served as the forerunner to the European Union.  As a small European country where French and German are both official languages alongside the native Luxembourgish, it has long served an important role smoothing relations between its two neighbors, which have historically served as the twin engines of EU growth and reform.

Consistently pro-European, Luxembourg’s voters approved the ill-fated European constitution in July 2005 with 56% in support of the constitution — and in support of Juncker, who pledged to resign if Luxembourgers opposed the effort — just weeks after two failed referenda in France and the Netherlands.

Juncker’s predecessor and mentor, Jacques Santer, Luxembourg’s prime minister from 1984 to 1995, served as president of the European Commission from 1995 to 1999.  Santer played a key role in negotiating the Single European Act of 1986 that fully brought the European single market into effect.  Santer, along with every other member of the European Commission, resigned en masse in 1999 over corruption among a handful of European commissioners, though Santer himself was never implicated directly with wrongdoing.

Before assuming the premiership from Santer, Juncker previously served as minister of labour from 1984 to 1989 and as finance minister from 1989 throughout the next two decades.  In fact, Juncker continued to serve simultaneously as finance minister, prime minister and Eurogroup president until 2009, when Juncker’s CSV colleague, his longtime justice minister Luc Frieden, was appointed finance minister.  In his role as Santer’s finance minister, Juncker became one of the chief architects of the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht and the single currency that Maastricht brought into being.  More recently, Juncker was instrumental in formalizing the role of the Eurogroup, the group of finance ministers from each member of the eurozone, and he served as the first Eurogroup president from 2005 until earlier this year, when Dutch finance minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem was chosen to replace Juncker.

It’s not an exaggeration to argue that no one in European policymaking circles today has more experience and responsibility for the creation, rollout and enactment of the single currency than Juncker, and he played a crucial role in more recent debates over European bailouts for beleaguered Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal.

From an initial industrial economy based largely on steel production after World War II, Luxembourg has developed a modern, post-industrial economy that depends in large part on financial services today.  With a GDP per capita of nearly $80,000, the tiny nation is by far the richest in the European Union.  That hasn’t protected Luxembourg from the broader economic trends that have swept the eurozone — it’s notched only tepid GDP growth since an initial contraction in 2009, though GDP contracted by 1.6% year-over-year in the first quarter of 2013 and unemployment has edged up to nearly 7%.

Its head of state, Grand Duke Henri, is essentially a figurehead, especially after the Luxembourgian parliament clarified that the Grand Duke’s signature is not necessary to enact laws after Henri controversially announced that he would not sign a 2008 law regarding euthanasia.

Juncker’s center-right, Christian democratic CSV has long dominated Luxembourgian politics, and all but one of Luxembourg’s prime ministers have come from the CSV since World War II.  The CSV controls 26 of the 60 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and during Juncker’s time in office, the CSV has formed governing coalitions with each of its chief rivals, the center-left, social democratic Lëtzebuerger Sozialistesch Arbechterpartei (LSAP, Luxembourg Socialist Workers’ Party) and the center-right, liberal Demokratesch Partei (DP, Democratic Party).  While that has perhaps led to an extraordinary amount of continuity within Luxembourg’s government, critics charge that the CSV’s political hegemony has led to a cozy environment where SREL misdeeds and other abuses have gone unpunished.

Though it’s been the CSV’s coalition partner for the past decade, it is the LSAP that has brought about early elections by threatening to bring down the government with a vote of no confidence.  Its leader Alex Bodry announced last Friday that the party would push for either Juncker’s resignation or fresh elections.

While the LSAP currently holds 13 seats, the Democratic Party holds nine seats and it’s currently the largest party sitting in opposition, though it has joined the CSV in government between 1999 and 2004.  Its president, Xavier Bettel, also the mayor of Luxembourg City, has taken just as critical a line against Juncker, accusing the prime minister of having failed to bring SREL misdeeds to light for public inquiry.  Bettel and the Democratic Party are especially well-placed to succeed in the next elections.  A poll earlier this spring showed that the young, openly gay Bettel is now more popular than Juncker, though the CSV continues to widely outpace the LSAP and the Democrats, though that could change if Luxembourgian voters want to punish Juncker — for the SREL abuses or more broadly for the sluggish economy.

Three smaller parties also sit in opposition: Luxembourg’s Déi Gréng (Greens) hold seven seats; a nationalist conservative party, the Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei (Alternative Democratic Reform Party) holds four seats; and the far-left Déi Lénk (The Left) holds just one seat.

Regling denies north-south European divide, claims EFSM a ‘lot of solidarity’

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If you were at Brookings Thursday afternoon, you could have taken away the following points:European_Union

  • Olli Rehn (pictured above), European commissioner for economic and monetary affairs and vice president of the European Commission, thinks the eurozone will return to growth by the end of 2013.
  • Klaus Regling, chief executive officer of the European Financial Stability Facility thinks there is no north-south divide in the eurozone.
  • The three-step plan presented by Jeroen Dijsselbloem, president of the Eurogroup of eurozone finance ministers, for future growth comes down to: balanced budgets, banking union and structural reform.  And, by the way, he thinks the main political problem in the eurozone is that European Union leaders have been so busy (for the past four years) dealing with the crisis that they haven’t had time to explain adequately their plans to the public.

jeroen

Consider this quote from Dijsselbloem (pictured above), whereby he says he and his colleagues have been so busy that they haven’t done a job of explaining themselves to the public:

‘[We’ve been so busy] solving the problems and dealing with the crisis, that we’ve not really involved a lot of people, the public, at large, as to what we’re doing, why we’re doing this, why it’s so crucial to work together along the lines of the strategy, why it’s so crucial to push forward structural reforms,” Dijsselbloem said.  ‘People are just experiencing the structural reforms in terms of, ‘I’m losing social rights,’ but we have to explain to them in order for young people to be able to participate also in labor markets, we have to rebalance maybe some countries’ securities and flexibilities in order to create new jobs.’

That’s a fairly audacious understatement of the democratic deficit problem in the European Union these days, and especially among the eurozone member states, who have had treaty upon treaty, condition upon condition dictated to them by Brussels and Berlin.

It also took two questions from the audience about deposit insurance for Dijsselbloem to confirm that their intention is for banking union reform to incorporate a eurozone-wide deposit insurance — in the fullness of time, of course.

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Regling (pictured above), one of five northern Europeans sitting on the panel today, went so far as to rebuke Jean Pisani-Ferry, a French economist and director of Bruegel, a Brussels-based think tank, for suggesting that the political risks in the European Union are rising.

The director general of [the European commissioner of economic and monetary affairs] is Italian, I have two deputies, one is French and one is Spanish, so in the end we’re all good Europeans,’ Regling said, after calling Pisani-Ferry’s question cheap.  ‘We are also not saying that Southern Europe has no problems — you implied that, I think that’s just wrong. We are fully aware there’s a lot of solidarity coming from European partners to these countries.  My institutions alone have dispersed in two years alone €185 billion, in two years alone… That’s a lot of solidarity.  These countries go through very painful adjustments, nobody here is denying that, although we’re all northern Europeans.  But I don’t like this north-south [dichotomy].  I’ve said this before, Latvia was the first country to take [tough structural adjustments] and that’s pretty northern European, so I think we should all be a bit more rational here.’

Reasonable economists can disagree about the policy mechanisms available to Greece or Italy or Portugal or Spain or Cyprus to pull their economies out of depression and how to repair the eurozone’s growing pains.  I’m not going to argue that Italy is in no more dire need of labor market reform than, say Sweden or The Netherlands — of course, Italy needs to modernize its economy if it wants to goose its long-term GDP growth potential.  Greeks have had to learn that income tax isn’t an optional exercise.  And Germany needs to figure out a viable trade model where the eurozone doesn’t exist, as it seemed in its first decade, as a means of enabling the European periphery to buy all of Germany’s exports.

But to refuse to see that there’s a north-south divide in Europe, that Mediterranean Europe is not at the center of today’s eurozone crisis, is abjectly short-sighted.  Regling has to realize that even the north-south divide in Germany is stronger than the east-west divide, despite the separation of west from east for nearly three decades!

It’s Italy that’s currently undergoing a crisis of government today, not France.  It’s Golden Dawn in Greece winning their highest percentage of votes in the history of post-dictatorship Greece, it’s not a neo-Nazi resurgence in Germany.  It’s Cypriot depositors who spent a week wondering if their five-figure savings would be taxed by 6.75%, not the Irish or the Latvians.  That’s not to deny that Latvia and Estonia and Ireland have made incredibly tough decisions in the past four years, but none of those economies are even as big as Greece, let alone Spain or Italy.

If eurocrats like Regling have such a hard time at Brookings, who are largely sympathetic to the goal of (if not always the precise strategies for) saving the eurozone, good luck dealing with Alexis Tsipras’s radical left Greek government or the next Silvio Berlusconi government in Italy or Artur Mas’s declaration of Catalan independence — all of which could happen by the end of 2014.

Photo credit to Kevin Lees — Brookings Institution, Washington DC, April 2013. 

Cypriot-‘troika’ deal means that Cyprus is leaving eurozone in all but name

cyrpuseuro

Another late Sunday night in Brussels, another eurozone bailout plan for Cyprus — and it seems likely that the new deal between Cyprus president Nicos Anastasiades, and the ‘troika’ of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund will endure much longer than last week’s disastrous plan, though capital controls to be implemented by the Republic of Cyprus’s government seem likely to lead to a backdoor eurozone exit for the nation of 1.15 million people.
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The Cypriot-troika deal in brief

The deal will shield depositors with under €100,000 in savings from a ‘haircut’ levy, but depositors with funds over €100,000 now face an even more painful result –what amounts to a haircut for depositors and creditors alike at the troubled Bank of Cyprus (the largest Cypriot bank), and an even deeper haircut for Laiki’s depositors and creditors, who will take huge losses as Laiki is wound down.  Laiki (also known as the Cyprus Popular Bank, the country’s second-largest bank) will be split into a ‘bad bank’ and a ‘good bank,’ the latter to be folded into the Bank of Cyprus.

All creditors at the Bank of Cyprus will see their interests restructured into a long-term equity interest and uninsured depositors will take an expected haircut of around 35% or 40%, with their deposits also held up for some time to come.

All the same, as Joseph Cotterill at FT Alphaville writes, the deal is better on two counts:

But there were two major injustices in the first Cyprus-Troika deal which made a mockery of the bail-in principle. Without debate, and upfront, it “taxed” depositors below the insured €100k limit alongside the uninsured. Then the tax was applied to either irrespective of bank. Why should small depositors in Barclays Nicosia or VTB Limassol take pain off large ones in Laiki or BoC, for instance. Well, finally, now we know. They shouldn’t have. The two unjust parts are gone.

Bonus points, I guess (if you’re a eurocrat), for structuring the deal in such a way that it can be implemented directly under Cyprus’s banking authority, so no need for another vote from the Cypriot parliament, which overwhelmingly rejected last week’s plan.  That plan featured a 6.75% levy on all depositors with savings under €100,000 in any Cypriot bank.  The parliamentary run-around, however, will only fuel the ‘democratic deficit’ hand-wringers throughout the European Union and breed resentment inside Cyprus and beyond.

The worst of the Irish and Icelandic precedents

Though the deal is ostensibly narrowed to focus on Cyprus’s two largest banks, and it’s better than last week’s plan, the deal essentially features the worst elements of the Irish and Icelandic examples.

Like Iceland, some of the Cypriot banking sector will be allowed to fail — Laiki’s uninsured depositors are out of luck, no matter whether they are Russian or Cypriot or whatever.  That’s exactly how Iceland approached its banking sector failure.

But unlike Iceland, Cyprus does not control its own monetary policy, so it won’t be able to devalue its currency and take the kind of independent monetary policy steps to rebalance its economy in the way that Iceland has.  Though Iceland is no longer the financial center it was before 2008, it has returned to GDP growth (around 3% in 2011 and 2.5% in 2012) and features relatively low unemployment — just 5.3% as of November 2012.  In contrast, Cyprus remains trapped in the ECB monetary policy straitjacket.

But like Ireland, the rest of the Cypriot banking sector will be essentially nationalized by the Cypriot government, with a European bailout that is likely to require additional bailout assistance and will come with increasingly stringent austerity measures that Cyprus’s government will be forced to take that will invariably depress its own GDP growth.  No one’s optimistic about Cyprus — it seems fated to suffer a fierce GDP contraction and a massive uptick in unemployment, joining Greece and Spain as one of the eurozone’s most troubled economies, no thanks to the Eurogroup’s clumsy policymaking.

Self-inflicted wounds to the European project

It’s worth repeating that the damage from the first Cyprus plan remains and cannot easily be reversed — Cyprus’s banking sector has now been decimated, probably permanently.  As one unsentimental Moscow economist put it, Cyprus’s beaches-and-banks economy is now just beaches.  The best hope for Cyprus’s economy is the rapid development of natural gas deposits that could bost its economy back after what will likely be a double-digit recession. But the ultimate scope and richness of those deposits are still unknown, and there’s no assurance that natural gas will be the country’s economic savior.

Brussels has so thoroughly undermined Anastasiades that he allegedly threatened to resign Sunday at one point, so it’s not clear how much legitimacy he’ll have in the next four years and 49 weeks of his five-year term, especially given that his own center-right party Democratic Rally (DISY, Δημοκρατικός Συναγερμός or Dimokratikós Sinayermós) controls just 20 of the 56 seats in the Cypriot House of Representatives (Βουλή των Αντιπροσώπων).

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In addition to the obvious ammunition that eurozone leaders have handed to euroskeptics, no one in Spain or Italy or Slovakia or Latvia should be feeling very good these days about keeping their money in national banks, deposit insurance or not.  Already today, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the newly elected president of the Eurogroup of eurozone finance ministers (pictured above with IMF managing director Christine Lagarde), has released a statement walking back earlier comments that appeared to hail the Cypriot bailout as a precedent for future deals.

It’s been a horrible start for Dijsselbloem, who succeeded Luxembourg prime minister Jean-Claude Juncker — Juncker has already (very gingerly) criticized the Eurogroup’s post-Juncker approach to Cyprus, and it’s hard to believe that Juncker would have made some of the more glaring errors that  Dijsselbloem has made — unlike Juncker, who was Luxembourg’s finance minister from 1989 to 2009 and has been prime minister since 1995, Dijsselbloem has served as the Dutch finance minister for barely over four months. It’s starting to look like the decision to appoint Dijsselbloem as a sort of compromise Eurogroup president (he’s a pro-growth member of the Dutch Labor Party who’s implementing an austerity regime in an otherwise budget-cutting government led by center-right prime minister Mark Rutte) may have been a poor one.

Capital controls are a backdoor Cypriot eurozone exit 

While it’s far from an original observation — more sophisticated financial commentators and economists have made the same point — the biggest takeaway from the weekend is that Cyprus has essentially been booted out of the eurozone, in large part due to the capitol controls that Cyprus looks set to enact tomorrow when banks in the country reopen — here’s a short summary of the menu of options from Yiannis Mouzakis, based on the capital control bill that Cyprus’s parliament passed over the weekend.  There’s optimism that the controls will be ‘very temporary,’ and will be somewhat lighter than originally feared, but it’s worth noting that Iceland’s controls are still in place even today, over four years after their imposition in late 2008.

The inescapable conclusion is that a ‘Cypriot euro’ is no longer the same thing as a euro throughout the rest of the eurozone.

As former banker Frances Coppola wrote over the weekend, the imposition of capital controls transforms Cyprus into something far short of an equal member of the eurozone:

Once full capital controls are imposed, a Euro in Cyprus will no longer be the same as a Euro anywhere else in the Euro area. It cannot leave the island. The Cyprus Euro will in effect be a new domestic currency. The imposition of capital controls in Cyprus is therefore the end of the single currency in its present form.  Continue reading Cypriot-‘troika’ deal means that Cyprus is leaving eurozone in all but name

What comes next for Cyprus and the EU following Friday’s haircut ‘bail-in’?

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So much for ‘nice Nic’ — it’s not that he’s reverted back to ‘nasty Nic’ so much as ‘nonessential Nic.’European_Unioncyprus_world_flag

Fifteen days after his inauguration as Cyprus’s new president, Nicos Anastasiades (pictured above, bottom), was forced into what’s now become a growing domestic, eurozone and international crisis when European Union and International Monetary Fund leaders presented Anastasiades with a €10 billion bailout package.

The catch, of which you’re almost certainly aware at this point, is that an additional €5.8 billion of savings will come in the form of a one-time levy on all bank accounts in Cyprus — deposits of  €100,000 will pay a 9.9% levy and deposits of under €100,000 will pay a 6.75% levy, even those deposits are insured by a system similar to the FDIC guarantee in the United States.  Senior bondholders won’t take a haircut.

So if you’re a hedge fund, for now at least, you’ll receive fully 100% of the face value of any debt you hold in Cypriot banks.  If you’re, say, a widowed Cypriot pensioner with €30,000 saved in a Cypriot bank, you’ll wake up Tuesday morning to find that you now have just €27,975.

It’s impossible to overstate just how politically explosive the plan was — in one fell swoop, Europe’s leaders have single-handedly done all of the following:

  • undermined the Cypriot presidential administration just days after it was elected with the support of those same European leaders and a promise by Anastasiades that any bailout would not include deposit haircuts;
  • provided ammunition to every euroskeptic in Europe from Beppe Grillo in Italy to Nigel Farage in the United Kingdom by reinforcing the notion that European institutions suffer from a lack of democratic legitimacy and gratuitously trample national sovereignty;
  • pulled the rug out from under the financial industry in Cyprus, essentially the only growing sector in the Cypriot economy;
  • handed to Cyprus’s parliament — where Anastasiades’s center-right Democratic Rally (DISY, Δημοκρατικός Συναγερμός or Dimokratikós Sinayermós), controls just 20 out of 56 seats — a strong reason to vote against the deal, thereby exacerbating the uncertainty throughout the week;
  • undermined the concept of deposit insurance throughout the entire eurozone;
  • by Europeanizing — or even internationalizing — what should have been a small matter in a country with a GDP ten times smaller than Greece’s, potentially initiated bank runs in Italy, Spain, and who knows where else throughout Europe;
  • needlessly antagonized Russia in the process, and may have provoked Russia into making a politically explosive counter-offer to Cyprus; and
  • probably did nothing to help Cyprus’s long-term economic outlook, because if the levy weren’t enough to depress Cypriot growth and undermine its banking industry, further austerity designed to reduce Cyprus’s public debt is certain to send Cyprus’s GDP swooning for some time to come.

That’s right — the first major decision of the Eurogroup of eurozone finance ministers since choosing as its president Jeroen Dijsselbloem, a center-left finance minister newly elected in the Netherlands just last autumn, is to demand an increase in the Cypriot corporate tax rate from 10% to 12.5% and a further increase on Cyprus’s savings tax.

That’s in addition to the deposit haircut that everyone’s mostly focused upon.

Anastasiades seems to have had very little option but to accept the deal, despite the fact that European leaders, including German chancellor Angela Merkel, actively supported his presidential bid in last month’s election:

[Anastasiades] spoke on Saturday of a ready-made decision imposed on Nicosia in the form of a blackmail: Take it or have the eurozone crumble….

In a written statement he issued on Saturday afternoon, Anastasiades said “Cyprus came across a previously made decision, a fait accompli.” In his defense he said that the emergency situation “did not arise in the last 15 days that we have undertaken the country’s administration.”

In the February 24 presidential runoff, Anastasiades won a landslide victory, with 57.48% of the vote to just 42.52% for health minister Stavros Malas, the candidate of the socialist Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL, Aνορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού or Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú).  

Anastasiades, in an address to the nation Sunday night, meekly argued that depositors would nonetheless receive bank shares in return for the one-time assessment and remained optimistic that recently discovered natural gas deposits in Cyprus might well boost Cyprus’s banks in the near future.

ATM Cyprus

The political fallout for Cyprus 

To the extent domestic politics is to blame for the current Cypriot crisis, AKEL is far from blameless — it’s unclear whether Cypriots will fault Anastasiades less than half a month into his administration more than his predecessor, Demetris Christofias, the country’s president from 2008 until last month.

Christofias and European leaders opened talks in June 2012 to secure a bailout, and Christofias even began to implement some small reforms, including a 5% VAT on food and drugs and an increase in the bank levy and tobacco taxes, but fell far short of European demands to reform public employment, the public pension system, and privatization of state-run industries in a country where unemployment has now risen to 14.7%.

In addition, the bailout talks were particular complex for other factors, including the outsized amount of the Cypriot banking sector’s debt, tied in large part to the Greek debt crisis.  In addition, many Russian oligarchs have deposited money in Cyprus’s banks, and Cyprus has been scolded in the past for the facilitation of money laundering from less-than-pristine Russian sources.

With Merkel up for reelection in September, it would have hardly been palatable for her to push through a German-funded bailout of dodgy Russian depositors, which was apparent enough in the latest round:

Merkel’s Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble had gone to Brussels with a firm mandate from Berlin: “no bail-in, no bailout”, said a member of her government. That meant: unless depositors took a hit, there would be no agreement and Germany would not contribute towards a package for Cyprus.

So talks never quite progressed, and with Cyprus facing imminent sovereign default, Anastasiades came rather easily to office with a plan to renew those talks, though he repeatedly refused to accept a deposit haircut of the kind now being implemented.

Although today was a bank holiday in Cyprus, banks were initially set to close on Tuesday, but will now be closed until Thursday as well, as the Cypriot parliament has repeatedly delayed taking up debate on the Cypriot package.

Anastasiades’s DISY, as noted above, controls just 20 out of 56 elected seats in the Cypriot House of Representatives (Βουλή των Αντιπροσώπων) and AKEL controls 19.  The centrist Democratic Party (DIKO, Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα or Dimokratikó Kómma), which backed Anastasiades in the presidential race, controls another nine seats.  Three additional parties that largely supported the center-left, independent Giorgos Lillikas in the presidential election control an addition eight seats, including five by the Movement for Social Democracy (EDEK, Κίνημα Σοσιαλδημοκρατών or Kinima Sosialdimokraton).

That means that if AKEL, EDEK and other small parties oppose the deal, DISY and DIKO hold just of 29 votes, just enough to pass the Cypriot package without any defections.

Moreover, DIKO’s leader has already called for changes to the bailout legislation, and it looks increasingly like Anastasiades lacks the support to win a vote in parliament, which means that European leaders will have to renegotiate the previous deal.  It’s not clear how much time Cyprus has before its banks (or its government) become insolvent.

Cold War redux?

Meanwhile, Russian president Vladimir Putin denounced the decision as ‘unfair, unprofessional and dangerous.’

Russia hasn’t indicated whether it will extend or otherwise change the terms of an existing €2.5 billion loan to Cyprus — if Russia refuses to extend the loan for another five years, the Cypriot bailout will need to be even larger.  So there’s that.

I wouldn’t be surprised if Anastasiades and members of the Russian government are discussing an alternative to the current European-IMF plan — the Republic of Cyprus, which occupies the southern half of the island of Cyprus, is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and a €17 billion bailout would be a small price for Russia to pay in exchange for closer military ties or a Russian naval base on the island.

Perhaps even more tantalizing for Russia, and its state-owned natural gas company Gazprom, are newly discovered natural gas deposits that Cyprus hopes will fuel future economic growth.  Indeed, there are already vague reports of a Russian counteroffer — the official Russian news agency seems to indicate that emergency talks have now been initiated:

Russia’s Gazprom has not offered the Republic of Cyprus financial assistance in restructuring the country’s banks in exchange for the right to gas production in the exclusive economic zone of Cyprus. Gazprombank initiated this offer, a spokesman for the gas giant told Tass.

That result would cause dismay among the United States and its European and NATO allies which, by the way, includes Turkey.  Turkey has occupied the northern half of the island of Cyprus since the 1970s — the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus declared its independence from the Greek Cypriot republic to the south in 1983, and the two have remained divided ever since.  So what’s an economic crisis and a domestic political crisis could also become a geopolitical security crisis soon enough.

The economic and political fallout for the eurozone

Reaction from economic commentators has been essentially universally negative since news broke early last weekend. Continue reading What comes next for Cyprus and the EU following Friday’s haircut ‘bail-in’?

Who is Jeroen Dijsselbloem?

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Most indications are that the next Euro Group head will be a relative newcomer to the group of eurozone finance ministers — Dutch minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem, who declared his formal candidacy for the job today.European_UnionNetherlands Flag Icon

As I noted at the beginning of the year in my piece on 13 up-and-coming politicians to watch in 2013, the current head of the Euro Group since 2005, Jean-Claude Juncker, also prime minister of tiny Luxembourg since 1995 and the Luxembourgian finance minister from 1989 to 2009, is stepping down from the role.

Dijsselbloem belongs to the anti-austerity social democratic Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA, Labour Party) — that has joined a coalition that’s headed by the decidedly more budget-obsessed Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD, the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) and prime minister Mark Rutte.

The second Rutte cabinet took office as a ‘purple’ Lib-Lab coalition in November 2012 after a closely fought election in September 2012, during which Labour leader Diederik Samsom fought for a more gradual process of budget cuts to bring the Dutch budget within 3% of GDP.

The Euro Group came into being in the late 1990s in advance of the introduction of the single currency as an informal group.  In 2005, Juncker became the group’s first president amid a push to formalize the group’s role in 2009 though a protocol to the Treaty of Lisbon:

The Ministers of the Member States whose currency is the euro shall meet informally. Such meetings shall take place, when necessary, to discuss questions related to the specific responsibilities they share with regard to the single currency. The Commission shall take part in the meetings. The European Central Bank shall be invited to take part in such meetings, which shall be prepared by the representatives of the Ministers with responsibility for finance of the Member States whose currency is the euro and of the Commission.

The Euro Group typically meets a day before the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of the Council (Ecofin) of the European Union — Ecofin is comprised of the wider group of all 26 EU member state finance/economics ministers.  Accordingly, the Euro Group typically dominates economic policymaking at the Council level.  At the Council, policies related to fiscal matters must be adopted unanimously, though other policies can be adopted by the EU’s qualified majority voting mechanism (i.e., essentially a supermajority formula that requires both a majority of the 27 member states and a majority of the EU population).

The Euro Group president is appointed for a term of 2.5 years, by majority vote of the Euro Group, and the next president could be appointed as early as Monday, though French finance minister Pierre Moscovici has called for a more formal and transparent process of selecting the next president.  Moscovici has also called on Dijsselbloem to outline his views on the future direction of the Euro Group, and Dijsselbloem is set to discuss goals at Monday’s meeting, though Juncker has been dropping all sorts of hints that Dijsselbloem’s selection is all but assured.

Dijsselbloem has been a member of the Tweede Kamer (the lower house of the Dutch parliament) since 2000, after spending four years as an assistant at the ministry of agriculture, nature management and fisheries.

In parliament, Dijsselbloem has been a moderating voice on highly charged issues like the role of Muslims in Dutch society.  In 2007, he spearheaded a commission on educational reform.  Earlier in 2012, when former Amsterdam mayor Job Cohen resigned as Labour leader, Dijsselbloem was chosen to serve as the party’s interim leader until Samsom was elected as the permanent Labour leader, and he was the fifth candidate on Labour’s list in the 2012 elections.

As early as the 2003 election, Dijsselbloem was seen as a Samsom confidante — they campaigned together in that year as the ‘rode ingenieurs‘ — the ‘Red Engineers’ — due to their red overalls and scientific backgrounds, Samsom in nuclear energy and Dijsselbloem in agricultural economics.

Despite just two months on the job as a pro-growth minister in a government that will seek to reduce the Dutch budget to within 3% of GDP in 2013, Dijsselbloem literally personifies the current fiscal debate in Europe.  It helps that the Netherlands was one of the original six countries that formed the predecessor to the European Union and that it retains one of Europe’s last remaining ‘AAA’ credit ratings.

On one side, as personified by Moscovici and French president François Hollande of the center-left Parti socialiste, only aggressive government policies to boost aggregate demand can reduce unemployment and jumpstart Europe’s economic engine.  Although even Hollande admits the need to bring France’s budget in line with the European Union standard, generally, of within 3% of GDP, Hollande’s government has preferred to implement tax increases rather than cut spending too deeply.

On the other side, as personified by German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble and German chancellor Angela Merkel of the center-right Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU, Christian Democratic Union), the key to prosperity — even in the face of recession — is to cut spending and narrow the budget deficit, thereby bringing more investment and business confidence by shoring up public finances. Continue reading Who is Jeroen Dijsselbloem?

13 in ’13: Thirteen up-and-coming world politicians to watch in 2013

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Earlier today, Suffragio kicked off its 2013 coverage of world politics with a look at 13 key elections to watch in 2013.

While we’ll watch as new leaders, from Egyptian president Mohammed Morsi to French president François Hollande to South Korean president Park Geun-hye begin their first full years of power, we’ll also watch for comebacks by former presidents — former Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva will make a decision about running for a third term in the 2014 Brazilian presidential election and former Chilean president Michelle Bachelet is the odds-on frontrunner to win a new term in Chile’s December 2013 election.

In addition, however, here are 13 up-and-coming politicians and other public figures who will figure prominently in the next 12 months — either because they are likely to come to power themselves in 2013 or because this year will will likely be a make-or-break year for them to achieve power beyond 2013. Continue reading 13 in ’13: Thirteen up-and-coming world politicians to watch in 2013