Tag Archives: european commission

What Iceland’s election tells us about post-crisis European politics

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Iceland was supposed to be different.Iceland Flag IconEuropean_Union

In allowing its banks to fail, neo-Keynesian economists have argued, Iceland avoided the fate of Ireland, which nationalized its banks and now faces a future with a very large public debt.  By devaluing its currency, the krónur, Iceland avoided the fate of countries like Estonia and others in southern Europe trapped in the eurozone and a one-size-fits all monetary policy, allowing for a rapid return to economic growth and rapidly falling unemployment.  Neoclassical economists counter that Iceland’s currency controls mean that it’s still essentially shut out from foreign investment, and the accompanying inflation has eroded many of the gains of Iceland’s return to GDP growth and, besides, Iceland’s households are still struggling under mortgage and other debt instruments that are linked to inflation or denominated in foreign currencies.

But Iceland’s weekend parliamentary election shows that both schools of economic thought are right.

Elections are rarely won on the slogan, ‘it could have been worse.’ Just ask U.S. president Barack Obama, whose efforts to implement $800 billion in stimulus programs in his first term in office went barely mentioned in his 2012 reelection campaign.

Iceland, as it turns out, is hardly so different at all — and it’s now virtually a case study in an electoral pattern that’s become increasingly pronounced in Europe that began when the 2008 global financial crisis took hold, through the 2010 sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone and through the current European-wide recession that’s seen unemployment rise to the sharpest levels in decades.

Call it the European three-step.

In the first step, a center-right government, like the one led by Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn (Independence Party) in Iceland in 2008, took the blame for the initial crisis.

In the second step, a center-left government, like the one led by Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir and the Samfylkingin (Social Democratic Alliance) in Iceland, replaced it, only to find that it would be forced to implement harsh austerity measures, including budget cuts, tax increases and, in Iceland’s case, even more extreme measures, such as currency controls and inflation-inducing devaluations.  That leads to further voter disenchantment, now with the center-left.

The third step is the return of the initial center-right party (or parties) to power, as the Independence Party and their traditional allies, the Framsóknarflokkurinn (Progressive Party) will do following Iceland’s latest election, at the expense of the more newly discredited center-left.  In addition, with both the mainstream center-left and center-right now associated with economic pain, there’s increasing support for new parties, some of them merely protest vehicles and others sometimes more radical, on both the left and the right.  In Iceland, that means that two new parties, Björt framtíð (Bright Future) and the Píratar (Pirate Party of Iceland) will now hold one-seventh of the seats in Iceland’s Alþingi.

This is essentially what happened last year in Greece, too.  Greece Flag IconIn the first step, Kostas Karamanlis and the center-right New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία) initially took the blame for the initial financial crisis.  In the second step, George Papandreou and the center-left PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement – Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) overwhelming won the October 2009 elections, only to find itself forced to accept a bailout deal with the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund.  In the third step, after two grueling rounds of election, Antonis Samaras and New Democracy returned to power in June 2012.

By that time, however, PASOK was so compromised that it was essentially forced into a minor subsidiary role supporting Samaras’s center-right, pro-bailout government.  A more radical leftist force, SYRIZA (the Coalition of the Radical Left — Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς), led by the young, charismatic Alexis Tsipras, now vies for the lead routinely in polls, and on the far right, the noxious neo-nazi Golden Dawn (Χρυσή Αυγή) now attracts a small, but significant enough portion of the Greek electorate to put it in third place.

The process seems well under way in other countries, too.  In France, for examFrance Flag Iconple, center-right president Nicolas Sarkozy lost reelection in May 2012 amid great hopes for the incoming Parti socialiste (PS, Socialist Party) administration of François Hollande, but his popularity is sinking to ever lower levels as France trudges through its own austerity, and polls show Sarkozy would now lead Hollande if another presidential election were held today.

It’s not just right-left-right, though. The European three-step comes in a different flavor, too: left-right-left, and you can spot the trend in country after country across Europe — richer and poorer, western and eastern, northern and southern. Continue reading What Iceland’s election tells us about post-crisis European politics

Regling denies north-south European divide, claims EFSM a ‘lot of solidarity’

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If you were at Brookings Thursday afternoon, you could have taken away the following points:European_Union

  • Olli Rehn (pictured above), European commissioner for economic and monetary affairs and vice president of the European Commission, thinks the eurozone will return to growth by the end of 2013.
  • Klaus Regling, chief executive officer of the European Financial Stability Facility thinks there is no north-south divide in the eurozone.
  • The three-step plan presented by Jeroen Dijsselbloem, president of the Eurogroup of eurozone finance ministers, for future growth comes down to: balanced budgets, banking union and structural reform.  And, by the way, he thinks the main political problem in the eurozone is that European Union leaders have been so busy (for the past four years) dealing with the crisis that they haven’t had time to explain adequately their plans to the public.

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Consider this quote from Dijsselbloem (pictured above), whereby he says he and his colleagues have been so busy that they haven’t done a job of explaining themselves to the public:

‘[We’ve been so busy] solving the problems and dealing with the crisis, that we’ve not really involved a lot of people, the public, at large, as to what we’re doing, why we’re doing this, why it’s so crucial to work together along the lines of the strategy, why it’s so crucial to push forward structural reforms,” Dijsselbloem said.  ‘People are just experiencing the structural reforms in terms of, ‘I’m losing social rights,’ but we have to explain to them in order for young people to be able to participate also in labor markets, we have to rebalance maybe some countries’ securities and flexibilities in order to create new jobs.’

That’s a fairly audacious understatement of the democratic deficit problem in the European Union these days, and especially among the eurozone member states, who have had treaty upon treaty, condition upon condition dictated to them by Brussels and Berlin.

It also took two questions from the audience about deposit insurance for Dijsselbloem to confirm that their intention is for banking union reform to incorporate a eurozone-wide deposit insurance — in the fullness of time, of course.

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Regling (pictured above), one of five northern Europeans sitting on the panel today, went so far as to rebuke Jean Pisani-Ferry, a French economist and director of Bruegel, a Brussels-based think tank, for suggesting that the political risks in the European Union are rising.

The director general of [the European commissioner of economic and monetary affairs] is Italian, I have two deputies, one is French and one is Spanish, so in the end we’re all good Europeans,’ Regling said, after calling Pisani-Ferry’s question cheap.  ‘We are also not saying that Southern Europe has no problems — you implied that, I think that’s just wrong. We are fully aware there’s a lot of solidarity coming from European partners to these countries.  My institutions alone have dispersed in two years alone €185 billion, in two years alone… That’s a lot of solidarity.  These countries go through very painful adjustments, nobody here is denying that, although we’re all northern Europeans.  But I don’t like this north-south [dichotomy].  I’ve said this before, Latvia was the first country to take [tough structural adjustments] and that’s pretty northern European, so I think we should all be a bit more rational here.’

Reasonable economists can disagree about the policy mechanisms available to Greece or Italy or Portugal or Spain or Cyprus to pull their economies out of depression and how to repair the eurozone’s growing pains.  I’m not going to argue that Italy is in no more dire need of labor market reform than, say Sweden or The Netherlands — of course, Italy needs to modernize its economy if it wants to goose its long-term GDP growth potential.  Greeks have had to learn that income tax isn’t an optional exercise.  And Germany needs to figure out a viable trade model where the eurozone doesn’t exist, as it seemed in its first decade, as a means of enabling the European periphery to buy all of Germany’s exports.

But to refuse to see that there’s a north-south divide in Europe, that Mediterranean Europe is not at the center of today’s eurozone crisis, is abjectly short-sighted.  Regling has to realize that even the north-south divide in Germany is stronger than the east-west divide, despite the separation of west from east for nearly three decades!

It’s Italy that’s currently undergoing a crisis of government today, not France.  It’s Golden Dawn in Greece winning their highest percentage of votes in the history of post-dictatorship Greece, it’s not a neo-Nazi resurgence in Germany.  It’s Cypriot depositors who spent a week wondering if their five-figure savings would be taxed by 6.75%, not the Irish or the Latvians.  That’s not to deny that Latvia and Estonia and Ireland have made incredibly tough decisions in the past four years, but none of those economies are even as big as Greece, let alone Spain or Italy.

If eurocrats like Regling have such a hard time at Brookings, who are largely sympathetic to the goal of (if not always the precise strategies for) saving the eurozone, good luck dealing with Alexis Tsipras’s radical left Greek government or the next Silvio Berlusconi government in Italy or Artur Mas’s declaration of Catalan independence — all of which could happen by the end of 2014.

Photo credit to Kevin Lees — Brookings Institution, Washington DC, April 2013. 

‘La bataille des chiffres’: EU leaders agree new budget deal

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Guest post by Michael J. Geary

European Union leaders reached agreement Friday on the EU budget (the multi-annual financial framework or ‘MFF’) for the period from 2014 to 2020.European_Union  After months of bickering, the 27 member states signed off on a deal totaling €908.4 billion, and the European Parliament will vote on the budget in March.

The budget is geared towards two — some would say conflicting — goals and political constituencies.

On the one hand, politicians argued that spending should be mobilised to support growth, employment, competitiveness and convergence, in line with the Europe 2020 Strategy. At the same time, some EU leaders in the United Kingdom, Germany and in the Netherlands, made clear that ‘as fiscal discipline is reinforced in Europe, it is essential that the future MFF reflects the consolidation efforts being made by Member States to bring deficit and debt onto a more sustainable path.’  The result is a smaller budget than was agreed for the previous budgetary period (2007 to 2013), yet one that is expected to achieve greater results to help pull the EU out of its economic malaise. A ‘spend less, achieve more policy’ strategy in an era when one in four Spaniards are unemployed seems doomed to fail.

The result, however, is not wholly surprising. Over the last four years, austerity and cuts in public spending have become commonplace throughout the EU, so it should come as no shock that the EU institutions should also tighten their belts.

Speaking after the negotiations concluded, German chancellor Angela Merkel said, ‘The agreement is a good agreement as it gives predictability for investors to create growth and jobs.’  José Manuel Barroso, the European Commission president, no doubt privately disappointed with the outcome, publicly voiced support for the deal saying the budget was ‘an important catalyst for growth and jobs.’

UK prime minister David Cameron can also be very pleased with the result, given that the agreement marks the first time in the history of the EU that its budget has been scaled back.  Cameron had gone to Brussels threatening to use the veto if leaders failed to make savings in real terms. He singled out the exorbitant salaries paid to some of the EU’s top officials, some of whom earn close to €15,000 per month and are taxed at just 8%. During the last five years, national-level tax increases have been imposed in addition to freezes on public and private sector pay, while officials working in the EU institutions have escaped austerity.  Cameron was determined, during the talks on the budget, to cut administrative costs despite opposition from French and Polish leaders who feared any cuts to the EU budget would affect generous subsidies to farmers and structural and cohesion funds.

Cameron was clearly relieved that his call for budgetary reductions met with friendly ears at least among some EU colleagues.  Over the past twelve months, he had been busy building a coalition among the Dutch, German and Scandinavian member states (the EU’s main paymasters) to reduce the budget in real terms.

Although Cameron and Merkel may well find themselves at odds over the UK’s role in the EU over the next five years, with Cameron determined to ‘renegotiate’ its role and Merkel equally determined to forge ever closer fiscal and political union, budget politics may have been a useful vector to find common ground.  Indeed, Merkel and Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte ultimately became strong supporters of London’s push to force austerity on the EU itself.  The unlikely emergence of the Anglo-German alliance was perhaps the most intriguing element of the negotiations. Continue reading ‘La bataille des chiffres’: EU leaders agree new budget deal