In refusing Catalan vote, Rajoy risks isolating himself and Spain’s future

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It’s not like Spanish prime minister Mariano Rajoy didn’t have any warning.cataloniaSpain_Flag_Icon

Catalan regional president Artur Mas called early regional elections for November 2012 for the express purpose of winning a mandate behind the call for greater autonomy and/or independence for Catalunya.  That didn’t work out so incredibly well for Mas and his autonomist center-right Convergència i Unió (CiU, Convergence and Union), which lost 12 seats in the 135-member Catalan parliament, and was forced to form a unity government with the pro-independence, leftist Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC, Republican Left of Catalunya).  Nonetheless, the election largely ratified the strength of the Catalan separatists, who control 87 seats to just 48 for Catalunya’s federalist parties. catalanmap

Three months ago, on September 11 — upon the celebration of Catalan national day — nearly 400,000 Catalan citizens formed a human chain stretching from the Pyrenees to the coast to emphasize just how fervently they support their right to self-determination.

Rajoy, much to his discredit, has ignored those Catalans, and Mas’s government has now set November 9, 2014 as the date for a referendum on Catalan independence — with or without the Spanish federal government’s blessing — after a vote last Thursday in the Catalan parliament that enjoyed the universal support of Mas’s Convergence and Union, the Republic Left and the Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV, Initiative for Catalonia Greens).  Rajoy (pictured above) and his justice minister Alberto Ruiz-Gallardón (pictured below) have made clear that not only is a referendum unacceptable under the Spanish constitution, but that they won’t be coerced into negotiating with Mas over devolving greater power (and funds) back to Catalunya, one of the wealthiest regions in Spain.  With over 7.5 million people, the region account for one-fifth of Spain’s economic output.

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If the vote actually goes ahead next November (and there’s some reason to believe that Mas is bluffing), it could constitute the most severe constitutional crisis since Spain’s return to democracy in the late 1970s.

To some degree, it’s easy to sympathize with Rajoy.  Though he took office just over two years ago when the center-right Partido Popular (the PP, or the People’s Party) ousted the center-left government headed by José Luis Zapatero and the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE, Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party) in November 2011, Rajoy’s popularity has plummeted as he’s pushed Spain through higher taxes and budget cuts.  That fiscal adjustment is plausibly both the cause and effect of a cycle of economic depression that’s left Spain reeling, including an unemployment rate of 26.6% that may be peaking only after five years of GDP contraction.  Spanish finances remain in tatters, despite the budgetary efforts of both the Zapatero and Rajoy governments, and Rajoy simply can’t afford to send more euros to Barcelona.  It’s not difficult to see the slippery slope that would begin once Rajoy starts negotiating with Rajoy over Spanish federalism.  An equally pro-autonomy regional government in Euskadi (Basque Country), which is also wealthier than the Spanish average, will be sure to follow with their own demands.  Other regions, like Galicia and Andalusia, the latter one of Europe’s most economically forlorn, might also make demands for stimulus.

It’s equally easy to see the naked political game that Mas is playing.  You need only look to the way that the referendum will be structured — Catalans will first be asked, ‘Do you want Catalonia to be a state?’ Those who agree with the first question will subsequently be asked, ‘Do you want Catalonia to be an independent state?’  The vote will be an easy way for Catalans to register their disapproval with Madrid without taking the kind of steps that could truly rupture Catalunya from Spain and that could leave Catalunya as an independent country outside the European Union (if only temporarily).  Mas is clearly using the referendum as a game to strengthen his hand vis-à-vis negotiations with Rajoy and, perhaps, to maximize his own standing within the Catalan electorate.  Some relatively moderate voices within the CiU coalition have even said that the referendum should only be held if it’s ultimately deemed ‘legal’ by Madrid.  The shell game of posing two questions to determine whether Catalunya should be a state or an independent state conveniently blurs the line of independence — it’s such a cynical ploy that it’s hard to take Mas seriously as a statesman, despite the legitimate sentiment of millions of pro-independence Catalans.

But Mas can get away with such demagoguery largely because of Rajoy’s intransigence.   Continue reading In refusing Catalan vote, Rajoy risks isolating himself and Spain’s future

Photo essay: Rosh Hanikra — and the tense Israeli-Lebanese border

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It’s staggering that Rosh Hanikra — the border between Lebanon and Israel on the Mediterranean coast — is in the news this week just days after I visited it myself.ISrel Flag IconLebanon

Israeli forces shot and killed two members of the Lebanese army Sunday night after a member of the Israeli Defense Force himself was killed earlier Sunday while driving a vehicle close to the border — it’s the first incident of its kind since 2010.

Rosh Hanikra, a few kilometers north of Akko (Acre), where the Crusaders established their chief port in the 12th century, is itself  somewhat of a tourist attraction in Israel — you can take a cable car from the road down to the beach, viewing some striking white cliffs that fall sharply to the sea.

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When you approach the border, there’s little to see beyond a locked gate — the actual border lies further beyond what’s clearly a barrier erected by the Israeli military.  So it’s not like there’s a line patrolled on one side by Lebanese forces and on the other by Israeli forces — just a foreboding gate with a blue star of David in the middle, with barbed wire ringing around.

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For now, Israeli forces believe that the Shiite Lebanese militia and political party Hezbollah (حزب الله‎) was not involved with Sunday’s border incident between Israel and Lebanon.  Hezbollah founded in 1985 as a group devoted to the removal of Israeli troops from the largely Shiite south of Lebanon — Israeli forces occupied Lebanon initially in the mid-1970s during the Lebanese civil war, but continued  to occupy southern Lebanon as a means of creating a buffer zone between Lebanon and Israel.

The silver lining to the event is that it seems like a contained, if tragic and unfortunate, event.  The last thing the Levant needs right now is heightened military tension between Israel and Lebanon, with Syria’s civil war still raging.  The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which has conducted peacekeeping operations in southern Lebanon since 1978, is working with both Israel and Lebanon to sort out what happened on Sunday (so far, the Lebanese solider appears to have acted alone), and both countries are said to be cooperating.

Though Israeli forces withdrew officially in 2000, clashes between Hezbollah and Israeli troops caused a 34-day war in summer 2006 — a war whereby the rest of Lebanon, its people and its infrastructure suffered significant collateral damage.  Since the 2006 war, however, Israel and Lebanon haven’t been involved in any major military engagements.  Hezbollah, however, remains one of the strongest forces in Lebanon, where Shiite Muslims have been historically poorer and less politically powerful (in comparison both to Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims), and it’s as much a political party and a civil aid society as a militia.  Most recently, Hezbollah has caused significant alarm within Lebanon over its support of Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian civil war.  The fear has been that Hezbollah’s unabashed support of the Assad regime will cause a corresponding push of support among Lebanese Sunnis in favor of anti-Assad rebels, thereby dragging Lebanon into Syria’s two-year conflict — a fate that Lebanon has largely avoided, outside of skirmishes in the north near Tripoli.

Bachelet’s most tenacious second-term foe? Lofty expectations.

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Michelle Bachelet, Chile’s president between 2006 and 2010, pulled off Sunday what no other Chilean president has done since the return of democracy in the post-Pinochet era — win a second, non-consecutive term.chile

To draw a contrast to the United States, only one president managed to return to the White House after leaving it — Grover Cleveland, who served two non-consecutive terms in the 1880s and the 1890s, though he’s routinely ranked among the more forgettable and inconsequential of US presidents.  Although it’s an inexact analogy (US presidents have never been barred from holding two consecutive terms the way that Chilean presidents are), Bachelet now faces the challenge of becoming one of Chile’s transformational 21st century leaders — in short, her challenge is not to become Chile’s Grover Cleveland.

Her return as president follows a four-year interregnum of government by Chile’s center-right — and in Sebastián Piñera, a president who represented the most moderate tendencies of the Chilean right, largely unsullied by association with the 17-year military regime of Augusto Pinochet.  Piñera’s term has been marked by relatively robust economic growth and sound government, even if Piñera himself hasn’t always been the most effective advocate for his own administration.  That became especially clear as Piñera seemed to lose control of the tussle between his government and student protesters throughout his term in office.

Moreover, the center-right did itself no favors in the process of nominating a candidate to succeed Piñera — the initial resignation of frontrunner Laurence Golborne last spring over private-sector scandal, the subsequent primary fight within the Chilean right between the more moderate Renovación Nacional (RN, National Renewal) and the more conservative Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI, Independent Democratic Union), the sudden withdrawal of the primary winner Pablo Longueira, and his hasty replacement with former labor minister Evelyn Matthei as the standard-bearer of the fractured center-right Coalición por el Cambio (Coalition for Change) — widely referred to as the Alianza por Chile (Alliance for Chile).

But even in a parallel universe where a united Alianza backed a scandal-free Golborne, Bachelet was always deemed the favorite to win the Chilean presidency.  Furthermore, though Bachelet nearly routed Matthei in the first round (46.70% to 25.03%), she won a nearly two-to-win landslide against Matthei in Sunday’s runoff (62.16% to 37.83%).  But as Bachelet prepares to return to La Moneda, she should fear that the same forces that rendered the Piñera administration so unpopular could also render her second term even more  unpopular, especially after raising such high expectations in her successful second-term presidential campaign.

Part of the problem is that her constituency today covers a wider portion of Chile’s political spectrum than it did in her first victory eight years ago.   Continue reading Bachelet’s most tenacious second-term foe? Lofty expectations.