The policy case for Maduro in Venezuela

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In my earlier companion piece today, I discussed the policy case for electing Henrique Capriles as the next president of Venezuela in an attempt (however vain) to separate the emotional divide in Venezuela from the policy rationales that underline each candidacy.Venezuela Flag Icon

Separating the policy from the personal is even more difficult in the case of Nicolás Maduro, however, whose campaign at every turn has been one massive embrace of Chávez, not only as a predecessor, but as nearly a deity in his own right.  So far, the Maduro campaign begins and ends with ‘Chávez,’ and there’s no guarantee that once elected, Maduro would wield a sufficient personal mandate even to take sufficient control of Chávez’s Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV, or United Socialist Party of Venezuela).

There’s frustratingly little substance as to what Maduro (pictured above) would do with a six-year presidency, let alone whether he could come to dominate a governing regime with a handful of key powerbrokers, such as energy minister Rafael Ramírez, finance minister Jorge Giordani, and national assembly president Diosdado Cabello, none of whom will easily step aside from their relative and significant fiefdoms in government.

But, as I asked with respect to Capriles earlier today, what policy arguments should motivate a moderate voter who enthusiastically supported Chávez in 1998 but who’s become increasingly disenchanted about the reality of Venezuelan governance and who may be flirting with supporting Capriles — is there a rational case for supporting Maduro over Capriles?  Continue reading The policy case for Maduro in Venezuela

The policy case for Capriles in Venezuela

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Tuesday kicks off the official start of the campaign in Venezuela for the presidential election on April 14.Venezuela Flag Icon

It’s a little artificial, given that the campaign really began unofficially the day that Hugo Chávez died and certainly both the pro-chavismo and opposition forces have been preparing for such a campaign since Chávez left for his final, unsuccessful round of treatment in Cuba.

Not surprisingly, much of the pre-campaign has been waged on visceral and emotional lines — the pro-/anti- chavismo debate in Venezuela has become inextricably so linked to personalities and identity politics that it’s often hard to step back and articulate the policy rationale for each candidate.  Henrique Capriles, the opposition candidate, has even stepped up his attacks against acting president Nicolás Maduro, in a much more insistent (even populist) tone than he ever took in his 2012 presidential campaign against Chávez.

That seems likely to intensify over the next 13 days.

But to the extent it’s possible to put aside the emotional in favor of policy, what policy arguments should sway, say, the moderate voter who enthusiastically supported Chávez in 1998 and well into the last decade but who has doubts about the performance of the government in recent years to make the jump to support Capriles (pictured above) and the broad Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD)?

Continue reading The policy case for Capriles in Venezuela

Why the ICC should drop its case against Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta

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Uhuru Kenyatta, after winning a seven-point victory in the March 4 presidential election, will be sworn in later this month as Kenya’s fourth post-independence president.kenya

But he’ll do so with a significant cloud hanging over his head — an indictment from the International Criminal Court on charges of crimes against humanity stemming from the last election in 2007, which precipitated two months of post-election violence that followed allegations of fraud in the narrow victory of incumbent Mwai Kibaki over challenger Raila Odinga.

What’s more, Kenyatta’s running mate, the next vice president of Kenya, William Ruto, is also a defendant on similar charges.

But Kenyatta, who comes from the Kikuyu ethnic group, and Ruto, who comes from the Kalenjin ethnic group, were on opposing sides five years ago, with Kenyatta backing Kibaki and with Ruto backing Odinga.

Those differences weren’t enough to stop Kenyatta and Ruto from joining forces this time around. Their partnership led to yet another defeat for Odinga and, this time around, the election result met with none of the civil turmoil that followed the previous election.

Nearly everyone in Kenya want to move beyond the 2007-08 violence.

Moreover, the ICC’s case against Kenyatta remains an evidentiary weak case by the standard of other ICC efforts. The ICC’s prosecution has already intruded bluntly into Kenya’s domestic politics and governance in a way that the entire Kenyan political elite opposes and that risks the court’s own legitimacy in sub-Saharan Africa, and the Kenyan people — in a free and fair vote — have elected Kenyatta their president, ICC charges or not.

The ICC indictments threaten to transform Kenya into somewhat of a pariah state — the European Union has pompously declared before the election that it would only engage in ‘essential conduct’ with Kenyatta in the event of his presidential victory, and U.S. secretary of state for African affairs Johnnie Carson was widely criticized for trying to subtly ‘warn’ Kenyans to make its choice carefully because it would have ‘global consequences.’

Kenya remains a key regional ally in the otherwise tough neighborhood east Africa, so Western governments will need to walk a tight diplomatic line, notwithstanding the ICC’s role:

A diplomatic fumble in dealing with Kenyatta could damage ties with a nation that has helped quell militant Islamists in the region and push a traditionally pro-Western state closer to China and other emerging powers hungry for openings in Africa.

Kenya’s supreme court earlier this year pointedly cleared Kenyatta, the son of Kenya’s first president Jomo Kenyatta, and Ruto to run in the election despite the ICC charges.

If that weren’t enough, the ICC may have already warped Kenyan politics by boosting Kenyatta’s bid through a sort of rallying effect — giving Kenyans a nationalist cri de coeur in a country where politics are still largely fought and won on ethnic lines.   Continue reading Why the ICC should drop its case against Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta