Guest post by Michael J. Geary
The ‘Yes’ campaign had narrowed the gap and last week’s polls have forced London and the British establishment to take evasive action. Some called on Queen Elizabeth II, on vacation at her Scottish estate, to make a statement in support of maintaining the Union. Others, fearing that the wind was behind the pro-independence movement, have adopted more Machiavellian tactics with claims that banks would abandon Scotland if the ‘Yes’ side won. Mark Carney, the governor of the Bank of England repeated that an independent Scotland could not use the pound. Most of the claims made by London seem as dodgy as the dossier that made the case for Britain’s involvement in the Iraq war; most of it does not stand up to objective scrutiny. But if ‘Team Independence’ wins on 18 September, what are Edinburgh’s immediate objectives and challenges?
* * * * *
* * * * *
Scotland is not the first sub-territorial entity to seek independence and will not be the last. There are almost 60 secessionist movements worldwide with claims to independence. Most face similar challenges post-independence, but modern Scotland is better equipped than most to successfully navigate these obstacles but examining past precedents.
Ireland exited the United Kingdom in 1921; Armageddon did not follow, although it did experience a brief civil war over the terms of the independence agreement, having failed to secure Northern Ireland. The Free State government adopted a new Irish pound, which was for a number of decades pegged to sterling and monitored by a currency commission. Dublin had no central bank until 1943 and the Bank of Ireland acted as banker to the government until the early 1970s. Having left the Commonwealth, Ireland sought greater interdependence from Great Britain through full membership of all the main international organizations, including the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Communities.
For Scotland, the first 18 months after a ‘Yes’ result will be crucial not only for finding a solution to the currency question but also in securing membership within the international community.
Edinburgh will, of necessity, have to seek membership of many international organizations including the UN, European Union, IMF and the World Bank; Scotland will not automatically inherit membership of any organization where the United Kingdom is already a member. At the UN, membership should be a relatively straightforward process. Singapore, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Eritrea and others each had to apply to join the UN once their independence dreams were realized. The only potential hazard might be a veto from a member of the Security Council.
History has shown that membership of the financial institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, for newly independent countries is somewhat similar. Independence did not confer automatic membership for any of the countries mentioned above and Scotland will have to make a fresh application. Membership of an international organization gives rise to rights and obligations of voting, as well as budgetary contributions and the (re)allocation of voting right with each enlargement. Here, again, the quest for membership should be plain sailing.
After independence, Scotland will have automatically exited the European Union, following past precedent. Algeria, administered as a départment of France, gained independence in 1962 and was therefore, for a short time, part of the EEC. Its independence did not confer on it an automatic right to Community membership, even if it wanted it. The biggest post-independence decision for Edinburgh will be whether to apply for EU membership and with it, access to the Single Market. Through Britain’s membership, Scotland has been implementing the acquis communautaire for the past 40 years. It should, on paper, be the least problematic enlargement in the EU’s history. However, a number of key issues would require negotiation. Should Scotland apply to become a full member, would it agree to become part of Schengen? Most likely, not. Strategically, it would make sense to negotiate an opt-out similar to the one secured by Ireland and Britain. Edinburgh could then negotiate to join the British-Irish Common Travel Area to facilitate the flow of air, sea and road transport without onerous border restrictions.
The currency question has featured prominently during the referendum campaign. Edinburgh has a number of options on its choice of currency after this week’s referendum. Scotland could create its own Scottish pound, or continue to use sterling notes and coins (which Ireland did). London has ruled this out but that is part of its anti-independence campaign strategy. It has to say ‘No’ during the campaign; attitudes might change next week. Once the dust has settled, some kind of currency union will inevitably emerge. This is the best option for both sides, given the large amount of cross-border trade. Should London still reject that idea of sharing the pound, other options include adopting the euro or the US dollar. Kosovo and Montenegro both use the single currency but are not members of the European Union. The British Virgin Islands, Ecuador and El Salvador, for example, use the dollar as their main currency. The euro and the US dollar might seem the least likely options; much will depend on London’s reaction to Scotland’s exit.
However, if Scotland applies for EU membership, it might well have to rethink its currency plans and attachment to the pound. After the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992, all new EU member-states are bound to adopt the euro. The United Kingdom and Denmark received opt-outs while Sweden decided soon after it joined in 1995 that it would keep its own currency. Presumably, for the first year after a ‘yes’ vote, Scotland would continue to use the pound sterling. Scotland is more pro-EU than England, and the Scots might well be inclined to adopt the single currency. If Brussels insists that adoption of the euro is a prerequisite for EU membership, Scotland could promise to do so but negotiate a long transition period. Much will depend on the negotiating skills of Scottish officials and, more importantly, on the goodwill of the existing member-states, each of whom could potentially veto Scotland’s accession.
Rather than be cast adrift in the North Atlantic as the ‘No’ campaign has implicitly threatened to do, Scotland’s challenge in the period immediately after a ‘Yes’ vote will be to submit letters of applications to the world’s main international organizations, quickly open accession negotiations and, after an absence of 300 years, regain its place within the global family of nation-states.
Dr. Michael J. Geary is Assistant Professor of Contemporary Europe at Maastricht University in the Netherlands and Global Fellow at the Wilson Center, Washington, DC.